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IDENTITY OF PARTIES IN BRIEF 
For purposes of this Brief and in compliance with URAP 24(d), 
Appellants, Kay Gneitting, Kerry Rick Hubble, and Wilderness 
Building Systems, Inc. shall be referred to jointly herein as 
"Wilderness and Hubble". Appellee, Dennis Vance, shall be 
referred to herein as "Vance". 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal was poured-over to the Court of Appeals for 
disposition by the Supreme Court on April 19, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 64D(d) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Taken from the Summary of Argument portion of Wilderness and 
Hubble's Brief (pages 3-4), Wilderness and Hubble appear to be 
presenting the following issues for this Court's review: 
1. Was the commission to which Vance was entitled pursuant 
to an agreement with Leon and Arlene Robinson ("Robinsons") 
"earnings from personal services", thereby making "twenty-five per 
centum" of those disposable earnings the maximum amount available 
for attachment or garnishment within the meaning of Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 64(D)? 
2. Was the trial court's order for the disclosure of the 
dollar amount of the settlement agreement among Robinsons, Kerry 
Rick Hubble, and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., in camera, in 
chambers to Vance's counsel, proper? 
3. Did the trial court appropriately enter a judgment in 
favor of Dennis Vance for $12,751.08? 
Other matters creep into Wilderness and Hubble's Brief and 
are addressed in the body of Vance's Brief. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is correctness, without deference to 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. In April of 1992, Vance, entered into an oral agreement 
with Robinsons whereby he agreed to personally work with an 
attorney retained to represent the Robinsons against Wilderness 
and Hubble and to provide that attorney with the facts of which he 
was aware to enable the Robinsons to file a lawsuit and, through 
his continued aid, obtain a judgment against Wilderness and 
Hubble. (Affidavit of Vance, U , R710) 
2. In consideration for his personal services, Vance was to 
receive a commission of 40% of the amounts recovered by the 
Robinsons after a judgment was entered against Wilderness and 
Hubble, less Robinsons' costs and attorney's fees. (Response of 
Scott Mitchell, attorney for the Robinsons dated April 14, 1995, 
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R724-725; Affidavit of Vance, 53, R710) 
3. Scott Mitchell was retained to represent the interests 
of the Robinsons against Wilderness and Hubble and successfully 
obtained a judgment against them for $41,364.53 on 30 April, 1993, 
and an additional judgment against Wilderness and Hubble for 
punitive damages in the amount of $49,560.12 on August 18, 1994. 
On that same day a judgment was rendered against Vance and in 
favor of Wilderness and Hubble for $24,780.56. 
4. On or about the 20th day of September of 1994, 
Wilderness and Hubble filed a Motion and a Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for an Order of Execution against Vance's payment 
proceeds pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69. (R380-387) 
5. As part of that Memorandum, specifically at paragraph 5 
thereof, Wilderness and Hubble asserted "that they are entitled to 
a garnishment order against any and all sums due Dennis Blaine 
Vance from Leon and Arlene Robinson". (R385) 
6. On the 20th day of October of 1994, the trial court 
signed an Order and Writ of Attachment ("Initial Order") pursuant 
to Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R423-425) 
7. The Initial Order instructed the: 
"Sheriff or Constable of Salt Lake County . . . to 
collect the judgment, with costs, interest, and fees, 
and to sell enough of Third Party Defendant's fVance'si 
non-exempt personal property, including but not limited 
to any and all sums due and owing by Leon and Arlene 
Robinson to said Third Party Defendant, Dennis Blaine 
Vance . . . " (R424) 
8. On the 17th day of February of 1995, an Application for 
Writ of Garnishment was filed to garnish amounts owed by the 
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Robinsons to Vance, and the court issued an Order of Attachment. 
(R655-656 and Wilderness and Hubble's Brief f5 at page 1) 
9. On or about the 13th day of March, 1995, the trial court 
signed an Amended Order ("Amended Order") pursuant to Rule 69 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R658-660) 
10. The Amended Order signed, pursuant to the old Rule 69 (o) 
(now 69(s)) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered that: 
"any and all sums due and owing by Plaintiffs Leon and 
Arlene Robinson to Third Party Defendant, Dennis Blaine 
Vance are attached and shall be applied towards 
satisfaction of the Third Party Plaintiff's judgments 
against Third Party Defendant". (R659-660) 
The Amended Order made no reference to non-exempt property as had 
been properly noted in the Initial Order. (See Fact %7) 
11. Rule 69(o) URCP, (now 69(s) which was in effect at the 
time of the court's order), grants courts only the right to: 
"order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt 
from execution, in possession of the judgment debtor or 
any other person, or due to the judgment debtor, to be 
applied toward satisfaction of the judgment". (URCP 
69(s), emphasis added) 
12. At the time the Amended Order was signed, only the 
proceeds from an earlier garnishment against the Robinsons 
received from West One Bank were in the possession of the 
Robinsons and none of the amounts which were transferred or 
credited for the personal services of Vance, apparently on March 
16, 1995, were in the possession of the Robinsons. (Uncontroverted 
Fact #9 from Vance' s Memorandum in Support of Claim for Exemption, 
R688; See responsive Memorandum in Opposition filed by Wilderness 
and Hubble R726-736) 
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13. At no time have any of the proceeds to which Vance is 
entitled from the Robinsons pursuant to the agreement for personal 
services been in Vance's possession. (Incontroverted Fact #10 from 
Vance's Memorandum in Support of Claim for Exemption, R688; See 
responsive Memorandum in Opposition filed by Wilderness and Hubble 
R726-736; See also uncontroverted Affidavit of Vance dated April 
11, 1995, f 6, R709-711) 
14. The amount due and owing Vance from the Robinsons was 
based solely upon a contract for personal services between Vance 
and the Robinsons wherein Vance was to receive 40% of all amounts 
recovered by the Robinsons as Plaintiffs and against Wilderness 
and Hubble, less attorney's fees and costs. (See admission of 
Robinsons in their "Response to Claim of Exemption on Behalf of 
Dennis Vance" filed by Scott B. Mitchell, attorney for the 
Robinsons on April 14, 1995, R724-725; See also Affidavit of 
Vance dated April 11, 1995, R709-711) 
15. Vance performed all services necessary in order to 
enable the Robinsons to recover a judgment against Wilderness and 
Hubble. (Uncontroverted Fact #12 from Vance's Memorandum in 
Support of Claim for Exemption, R689; See responsive Memorandum 
in Opposition filed by Wilderness and Hubble R726-236; See also 
uncontroverted Affidavit of Vance dated April 11, 1995, H 5, R709-
711) 
16. On or about the 16th day of March, 1995, on the eve of 
foreclosure of assets of Wilderness and Hubble, Wilderness and 
Hubble and Robinsons entered into a Stipulated Settlement 
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Agreement, designed to be confidential in nature, wherein the 
total judgment was deemed satisfied. (See Wilderness and Hubble's 
Brief, 55 at page 8 and Exhibit D attached to that Brief) 
17. Funds to which Vance would otherwise have been entitled 
under his agreement with the Robinsons were retained by Wilderness 
and Hubble as an offset under the apparent authority of the 
Amended Order and were never delivered to the Robinsons or Vance. 
(Uncontroverted Fact #14 from Vance's Memorandum in Support of 
Claim for Exemption, R689; See responsive Memorandum in 
Opposition filed by Wilderness and Hubble R726-736) 
18. Rule 69(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended 
effective January 1, 1995) requires that at the time a Writ of 
Execution is issued, the clerk shall attach to the writ a notice 
of execution and exemptions and a right to a hearing and two 
copies of an application by which the judgment debtor may request 
a hearing. (URCP 69(g)) 
19. No such notice was ever given to the judgment debtor, 
Dennis Vance. (Uncontroverted Fact #16 from Vance' s Memorandum in 
Support of Claim for Exemption, R689; See responsive Memorandum 
in Opposition filed by Wilderness and Hubble, R726-736; See also 
the file reflecting no notice.) 
20. Section 69(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended 
effective January 1, 1995), states that "the judgment debtor . . 
. may request a hearing to claim any exemption to the execution". 
(URCP 69(h)) 
21. Vance complied with that provision and filed a Request 
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for Hearing on the 6th day of April, 1995. That action began this 
matter now under appeal. (See Request for Hearing R712-713) 
22. On April 14, 1995, the trial court initiated a telephone 
conference call with counsel for Wilderness and Hubble and Vance 
and memorialized the substance thereof in a Minute Entry which 
reads: 
Telephone call with court, Kent Christiansen & Jeff 
Swinton. Counsel agree there is a dispute as to the law 
and enter a stipulation that third-party plaintiff's 
(sic) to respond by 04-24-95 to initial third-party 
memorandum and answer by 04—28—95. The court will then 
rule in the law and the parties will determine if an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary. (R723 and a copy 
attached to this Brief as Exhibit "A") 
23. On May 2, 1995, counsel for Vance filed a Notice to 
Submit for Decision requesting that the court act upon the 
memoranda filed. Vance, as the only party having requested a 
hearing, had effectively withdrawn that request by filing the 
Notice to Submit. Copies were sent to opposing counsel. A copy 
of the Notice to Submit is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" (R835-
837) 
24. No objection to the Notice to Submit was made nor was a 
request for a hearing filed by either counsel for Wilderness and 
Hubble or counsel for Robinsons. (See file) 
25. Six weeks later, on June 19, 1995, the court, having 
received no objections or further requests from counsel, initiated 
a conference call among all three counsel to announce its 
decision. The court memorialized the call with a Minute Entry 
which reads: 
Telephone conference with court, Jeff Swinton, Kent 
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Christiansen and Scott Mitchell. Motion for claim 
exemption of Dennis Vance is granted. Costs and 
attorney fees must come off on his portion and the 
attorney's (sic) are to work out the money amount. 
(R840, Exhibit "J?" to Wilderness and Hubble1 s Brief) 
26. A copy of an Order was circulated among counsel on June 
19, 1995. No objections were filed, and three weeks later, on 
July 10, 1995, the Order was signed and entered by the court 
("July Order"). A copy of the July Order is attached as Exhibit 
"F" to Wilderness and Hubble's Brief. (R841-843) 
27. The July Order resolved all legal issues and 
specifically created a self-effectuating formula for determining 
the exemption to which Vance was entitled, requiring that the 
parties "attempt to determine, agree and divide among themselves 
the amounts to be paid to or retained by each, Robinsons, Vance, 
and Hubble." (Exhibit "F" to Wilderness and Hubble's Brief and 
R842) 
28. The trial court anticipated the cooperation of the 
parties and did not provide for any additional court involvement, 
having instructed the parties to complete the calculations without 
court participation. (R841-843) 
29. The July Order was a final order. 
30. No appeal was taken from the July Order within 30 days 
of its entry and Wilderness and Hubble's rights to appeal expired 
on August 11, 1995. (See file) 
31. Failing to receive the ordered cooperation from 
Wilderness and Hubble, Vance sought the trial court's supplemental 
post-judgment assistance. Vance filed a document on August 17, 
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1995, entitled "Request for Compliance Order and Determination of 
Accounting to Fix Exemption for Vance" which sought to have the 
trial court enforce compliance with its final July Order 
("Supplemental Request"). A copy of the Supplemental Request is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C". (R844-854) 
32. On September 7, 1995, Scott Mitchell, counsel for 
Robinsons, responded to the Supplemental Request indicating that, 
Plaintiffs represent that they are ready, willing and 
able to provide the requested information in accordance 
with the order to the Court 
Counsel also clarified the amount of attorney's fees and costs 
actually received by him and his clients and the amount retained 
by Vance. (R859-860) 
33. On September 5, 1995, counsel for Wilderness and Hubble 
responded to the Supplemental Request by stating that they 
. . .would propose to the Court that the terms and 
conditions of the settlement agreement be disclosed to 
the Court, in camera, and that the Court render its 
decision as to what, if any amounts, are due Third-Party 
Defendant Vance; thus preserving the confidentiality of 
the Wilderness Building Systems, Hubble and Robinsons' 
settlement agreement. (R857) 
34. Acting on the expressed willingness and suggestion of 
Wilderness and Hubble, on October 12, 1995, the court invited all 
three counsel into chambers to have Wilderness and Hubble, in 
camera, disclose the dollar amount of the confidential settlement 
agreement so the parties could calculate the amount of the 
exemption as set forth in the final July Order. (See Notice dated 
25 September 1995, R876) 
35. As is noted in the Minute Entry of that in-chambers 
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hearing, "The parties agreed on formula, and judgments were 
determined." Counsel for Vance was instructed to prepare an order 
to document the agreement reached among the parties in the 
presence of the trial court. (See Minute Entry of 12 October, 
1995, attached hereto as Exhibit "D"; R878) 
36. Counsel for Vance prepared the document on October 12, 
1995, and entitled it "Judgment on Claim of Dennis Vance" 
("Supplement Order"), a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "E" and sent copies to other counsel via facsimile on that 
day. It was signed and entered twelve days later, on October 24, 
1995, without objection. (R879-881) 
37. On October 27, 1995, the Notice of Appeal was filed, 
referencing only the court's order "entered in this matter on 
October 24, 1995". (R883-884) 
38. On December 11, 1995, Vance filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition which included a request under Rule 33, URAP, that 
this Court determine that this appeal is frivolous, taken for 
delay, and interposed for an improper purpose such as to harass 
and cause needless increase in the cost of litigation. Ruling on 
that Motion was deferred. (See file) 
39. Vance, is a debt collector by profession and his income 
is generated from commissions or percentage payments from amounts 
he personally collects for his clients. (Vance Affidavit, \2, 
page 2, R709) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Vance first argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over 
the trial court's order of July 10th which was not appealed until 
October 27, 1995- The July Order was a "final order" requiring no 
further intervention by the court. Further aid was sought only 
because of Wilderness and Hubble's lack of cooperation. That 
resulted in a supplemental judgment issued by the court on October 
24, 1996. Therefore, the appeal was not timely filed. 
Vance, a debt collector by profession, entered into an oral 
contract with the Robinsons to aid in the collection of a claim 
they had against Wilderness and Hubble. Vance was to receive 40% 
of all amounts recovered from Wilderness and Hubble, less the 
Robinsons' attorney's fees and costs. A judgment was obtained 
against Wilderness and Hubble and collected by Robinsons. A 
judgment was also rendered against Vance and collection efforts of 
Wilderness and Hubble through attempted garnishment and ultimately 
a court ordered equivalent of garnishment in the form of an order 
of attachment on the commission owed to Vance and held by or due 
to be paid to Robinsons from Wilderness and Hubble, without 
consideration of Vance's statutory exemption, resulted in this 
action. 
Wilderness and Hubble argue that there was no commission 
agreement. Vance disagrees, and for good and substantiated 
reason. He cites references to the record showing the 
understanding of all of the parties to the terms of that 
agreement. 
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Vance argues that the money to which he is entitled, is 
"earnings for personal services", thereby subject to the 
protection afforded by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
64D(d)(viii)(A) which provides that the maximum amount of his 
disposable earnings available for attachment or garnishment is 
twenty-five per centum of his disposable earnings. 
Wilderness and Hubble waived any rights they had for an 
evidentiary hearing on the exemption issue; they participated in 
two conference calls with the court and never sought more. After 
the court's ruling, Wilderness and Hubble accepted the actions 
taken by the trial court without objection, until this appeal. 
Finally, Wilderness and Hubble argue that Vance should not be 
entitled to retain anything at all while at the same time 
forgetting that the court found Wilderness and Hubble liable for 
punitive damages in light of their dealings with the Robinsons. 
Vance argues that those demanding equity from a Court must have 
clean hands themselves. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE ORDERS SUBMITTED 
FOR REVIEW 
Wilderness and Hubble's appeal focuses on the July Order. 
The July Order was a final order requiring no further intervention 
by the trial court. No appeal was timely taken and this Court 
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear it now. By the time it 
became apparent to Vance that Wilderness and Hubble would not 
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voluntarily cooperate with the July Order, the time for appealing 
the July Order had expired. Vance was required to seek post-
judgment help from the trial court which resulted in the 
Supplemental Order from which Wilderness and Hubble have appealed. 
By this appeal, Wilderness and Hubble are seeking only to 
further delay the obligation to return to Vance the money 
Wilderness and Hubble wrongfully withheld, which was always exempt 
from execution in March of 1995. They are also attempting to 
force Vance to exhaust any hope of personal recovery through his 
required payment of attorney's fees to lay claim to his statutory 
exemption. 
By their contempt of the July Order, Wilderness and Hubble 
are now seeking to wrongfully and belatedly capitalize on the 
supplemental involvement of the trial court which they, 
themselves, forced upon Vance. They failed to timely appeal the 
final July Order and are now seeking a second bite of the apple by 
asking this Court to integrate that July Order with the 
Supplemental Order. 
In the case of Wheelwright v. Roman, 165 P. 513, 514 (Utah 
1917) the Utah State Supreme Court was asked to interpret the 
finality of a judgment which declared: 
. . .that the deceased was the owner of all of said real 
estate at the time of her death, that at said time she 
also was the owner of all of the notes and mortgages, 
and that the defendant surrender all of said notes and 
mortgages to the plaintiff, as administratrix of said 
estate, and to account to her for any interest he had 
theretofore collected and for the rents and profits 
derived by him from said real estate since the death of 
the decedent. (Emphasis added) 
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On that occasion, the Court found at 517: 
Plaintiff's counsel further contend that, in view that 
the judgment requires an accounting to be made by the 
defendant, for that reason the judgment is not final, 
and hence not appealable. The contention is not 
tenable. What is required from the defendant is a part 
of the final judgment. . . The mere fact that the 
defendant is ordered to deliver the property to the 
plaintiff and to account to her for the interest that he 
may have collected on the notes and mortgages, etc., 
does not affect the finality of the judgment. (Emphasis 
added) 
The Wheelwright analysis parallels the facts of this case. 
What was required of the parties in this action—to sit down and 
determine among themselves how the money should be divided—was "a 
part of the final judgment". In the Wheelwright case, accounting 
"for any interest he had theretofore collected and for the rents 
and profits derived by him from said real estate since the death 
of the decedent" clearly required some analysis and discussion 
among the parties but was not contemplated to have involved the 
court. Based upon that, the 1917 order was final. In like 
manner, the July Order in this case was final and the right to 
appeal could not be extended by the intentional failure on the 
part of Wilderness and Hubble to comply with the ministerial 
functions the trial court delegated to the parties and their 
counsel. 
Although what remained to be done by the parties in our case 
was not technically an "accounting", there are cases in Utah which 
may be viewed as similar to this in that they address 
circumstances where an accounting remained to be provided. Some 
have found that the order appealed from is interlocutory. Those 
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cases include, however, either one or both of the following 
elements not found in our case. Either they are actions wherein 
an accounting is a part of the actual relief being sought (See 
Meagher v. Equity Oil Company, 299 P.2d 827 (Utah 1956)); or, it 
is anticipated at the time of the order that the court's 
subsequent involvement or later determination will be required 
(See Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 
1986) ) . 
Vance did not seek an accounting, only a determination of his 
entitlement to an exemption and the court granted that request. 
Further, the court asked the parties to calculate the numbers 
among themselves with no reference to or anticipation of any later 
court determination. The court's later involvement was not the 
result of unfinished work by the court, but of contempt of the 
court's July Order by Wilderness and Hubble. Ultimately 
Wilderness and Hubble volunteered to provide the information, in 
camera, and the court granted that request in October, 1995. 
Even in the Meagher case cited above, the court held at 831 
that although the portion of the order dealing with the requested 
accounting was viewed as interlocutory, "the judgment is final 
insofar as it determines the rights of the parties hereto in the 
Sheridan lease." Utah follows the general rule nationally, and 
the Meagher case, supra, is cited for that proposition in 3 ALR 2d 
342, Later Case Service at page 300. The general proposition 
noted at 346 in the body of the annotation which reads: 
. most courts recognize the general rule that 
finality for purposes of appeal is not necessarily 
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destroyed by reason of a provision for future 
accounting- The determinative factor is whether the 
equities have been finally adjudicated or the rights of 
the parties ascertained and finally determined. 
Therefore, the determination in the July Order that Vance's 
commission under his agreement with the Robinsons is earnings from 
personal services and that the maximum amount of his disposable 
earnings available for attachment or garnishment is twenty-five 
per centum of his disposable earnings is fixed, final, and no 
longer subject to appeal, (See URCP 64D(d) (viii) (A)) The time for 
appealing the July Order passed without an extension sought or 
granted. 
The July Order went even further than ruling on the 
substantive legal issue. It went into some detail to set forth 
the formula under which the numbers could be determined among the 
parties. It required the deduction of all amounts owed back to 
the Robinsons by Vance for their attorney's fees and costs under 
their agreement and it further required that Vance's aggregate 
disposable earnings available for attachment or garnishment be 
"calculated in accordance with this order under Rule 64D (d) 
(viii) (A), URCP." 
The ALR citation, supra, at 373-374 addresses circumstances 
where the order fixes the principles under which the account is to 
be taken. There appears to be no Utah case on point and the ALR 
citation notes that most of the cases on that point have arisen in 
Illinois where it has generally been held that 
"a decree which determines the equities in controversy 
is final for purposes of appeal, where it fixes the 
rules and principles upon which the account is to be 
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made." (Empha sis added) 
If Wilderness and Hubble had felt that the July Order was 
confusing or required further clarification for its proper 
interpretation, Wilderness and Hubble could and should have filed 
a Motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure within 10 days after the entry of the 
judgment. They did not. They could have appealed it within 30 
days after the entry of judgment- They did not. Now they are 
essentially seeking a retroactive extension of time to appeal the 
July Order. It is not warranted in the law. 
The Supplemental Order was a post-judgment matter not 
originally contemplated by the July Order and was necessitated by 
the intentional disregard of the July Order by Wilderness and 
Hubble. The Supplemental Order, although titled as a Judgment to 
give it legal teeth, was merely the written representation of an 
agreement among counsel voluntarily entered into in the presence 
of the trial judge. There is nothing from which to draw 
objection. Again, if Wilderness and Hubble had felt that the 
Supplemental Order was confusing or required further clarification 
for its proper interpretation, Wilderness and Hubble could and 
should have filed a Motion to alter or amend the judgment under 
Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure within 10 days after the 
entry of the judgment. They did not. They have now cast the 
burden upon this Court. 
Counsel for Wilderness and Hubble now complains that the 
court should not have compelled Wilderness and Hubble's counsel to 
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disclose any information relating to the "confidential" settlement 
agreement between Wilderness and Hubble and Robinsons. He seems 
to have forgotten his own words written on September 5, 1995, 
wherein he responded to the Supplemental Request with a court-
filed document stating that his clients... 
. . .would propose to the Court that the terms and 
conditions of the settlement agreement be disclosed to 
the Court in camera
 f and that the Court render its 
decision as to what, if any amounts, are due Third-Party 
Defendant Vance; thus preserving the confidentiality of 
the Wilderness Building Systems, Hubble and Robinsons' 
settlement agreement. (R857) 
His request became the court's command. An "in camera" 
meeting was scheduled by the court. Counsel for Wilderness and 
Hubble then sat in that meeting with the other attorneys in this 
case on October 12, 1995. There is no evidence in the record that 
he asked the court then for "an opportunity at hearing to present 
evidence supporting the grounds and reasons for maintaining the 
confidential nature of the settlement agreement" as he now 
suggests on appeal should have occurred. (See Wilderness and 
Hubble' s Brief at 9-10 and Minute Entry at R878) He did not raise 
that issue earlier in his responsive Memorandum filed on September 
5, 1995. (Fact #33, above, and R857) He noted no objection for 
the record to the numbers agreed upon by the parties and which 
counsel for Vance was instructed to put in judgment form. The 
actual Supplemental Order was transmitted via facsimile to counsel 
for Wilderness and Hubble on October 12 and no objection was 
voiced or filed. It was not until 12 days later that the 
Supplemental Order was signed and entered. Again, no response. 
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Counsel for Wilderness and Hubble had outlined the procedure for 
the court and indicated that if it were followed, it would 
preserve, in his words, "the confidentiality of Wilderness 
Building Systems, Hubble and Robinsons' settlement agreement". 
There has been no violation of the confidential nature of the 
agreement except to the extent volunteered by counsel for 
Wilderness and Hubble, 
The Supplemental Order is not a "judgment" in the sense 
contemplated by the law. It is an agreement among attorneys that 
received court approval, entitled "judgment" for purposes of 
collection. This Court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from 
a joint agreement among parties, even if it is entitled a 
"judgment". Therefore, this entire appeal should be summarily 
dismissed. 
Finally, this appeal is either, or both, frivolous or taken 
for delay. The pattern of conduct leading up to this appeal 
illustrates the degree of foot-dragging, gamesmanship, and 
contempt of the trial court's order displayed by Wilderness and 
Hubble. The appeal from the July Order has no merit at all. The 
weak basis under which the appeal has been brought—particularly 
in light of the attempted belated integration of the July Order 
speaks volumes regarding true motive. 
Wilderness and Hubble are keenly aware of the extended cost 
of this action, which began merely with a Request for Hearing to 
determine Vance's right to an exemption to sustain life. Vance 
was successful under the legal theory, however, Wilderness and 
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Hubble have been careful to ensure that every dollar to which 
Vance is entitled is consumed by attorney's fees. 
As a result, under Rule 33, URAP, Vance respectfully requests 
that this Court order that he receive, from either Wilderness and 
Hubble or their counsel, costs, which include damages, doubled, 
and his reasonable attorney's fees in this matter. 
II. VANCE IS ENTITLED TO 40% OF ALL AMOUNTS CREDITED TO 
ROBINSONS FROM WILDERNESS AND HUBBLE. 
Wilderness and Hubble argue that there was no agreement for 
Vance to receive 40% of the amounts recovered by Robinsons from 
him. In support of their argument, Wilderness and Hubble point 
out apparent inconsistencies in the trial and deposition testimony 
of Vance throughout these proceedings. Taken out of context, 
inconsistencies appear, but the actions of Wilderness and Hubble 
prior to the allegations in their Brief say just the opposite. 
Wilderness and Hubble are attempting to hide that from this Court. 
(See Wilderness and Hubble's Brief, Fact #7 at page 2.) 
On September 20, 1994, Wilderness and Hubble filed a document 
with the trial court entitled "Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
and Order of Execution Against Payment Proceeds Pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. Rule 69" (R383-387) ("September Memo"). That was where 
Wilderness and Hubble made the argument to the trial court that 
they were entitled to execute on the 40% payment claim which Vance 
was entitled to receive from Robinsons. In that Memorandum 
Wilderness and Hubble commented upon the clarity of Vance's 
deposition testimony: 
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4. During his deposition of April 13, 1992, 
Third-Party Defendant Vance also indicated that he and 
the Robinsons had agreed that he would receive forty 
percent (40%) of any funds collected against the 
Defendants relative to the lawsuit. (September Memo, 
page 3—emphasis added; R385) 
In the September Memo, Wilderness and Hubble further stressed 
the trial testimony to support their claim for Vance's money. 
3. The evidence presented at the June 1, 1994 
trial revealed that Dennis Vance entered into an 
agreement with the Robinsons prior to the commencement 
of this lawsuit wherein he would receive a percentage of 
any recovery they might obtain from Defendants Kerry 
Rick Hubble, Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. or Kevin 
Kay Gneiting." (September Memo, page 3--emphasis added; 
R385) 
Now, ironically, Wilderness and Hubble have done a flip-flop, 
have either ignored or forgotten their own statements and 
conclusions filed in September, 1994. Today in their Brief at 
page 8 they twist the facts and say: 
During the June 1, 1994 trial of this matter, 
Dennis Vance also testified uneguivocally that there was 
no agreement between he and the Robinsons relative to 
this case. (Emphasis added) 
Look who's talking about inconsistencies. Even the Robinsons 
have acknowledged that such an agreement exists. (See Fact #14) 
Robinsons' counsel filed a Response to Vance's claim for an 
exemption on the 14th day of April 1995, and admitted that there 
was an agreement, and that attorneys fees and costs should be 
taken from it. If there were no such agreement then why did 
counsel for Wilderness and Hubble author the language in the 
Amended Order, entered on March 13, 1995, which reads: 
". . . it is ordered that any and all sums due and 
owing by Plaintiffs Leon and Arlene Robinson to said 
Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Vance are attached and 
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shall be applied towards the satisfaction of Third-Party 
Plaintiff's judgments against Third-Party Defendant." 
(Order at pages 2-3; R658-660) 
Certainly there was an agreement. Vance is entitled to 
recover and is further entitled to claim his rightful exemption. 
III. UTAH AND THE VAST MAJORITY OF COURTS RECOGNIZE AN 
EXEMPTION FOR EARNINGS FROM PERSONAL SERVICES SIMILAR TO THOSE 
PROVIDED BY VANCE 
Wilderness and Hubble have attempted to persuade this Court 
to follow a small minority of other jurisdictions, using cases 
that are dissimilar, and overlooking entirely what has been said 
about this issue in the State of Utah. The issue for this Court 
is simple. Is the money to which Vance is entitled, "earnings for 
personal services"? 
Wilderness and Hubble would have this Court stumble over 
whether the money is "wages" or whether it is "disposable 
earnings", whether Vance is an "independent contractor" or an 
"employee", and finally suggest that this Court make its decision 
on the good old "strong policy consideration" argument in light of 
Vance's conduct. 
Vance was clearly "self-employed". He retained the services 
of no other person or entity in his arrangement with Robinsons 
except, perhaps, their attorney. The commission or percentage to 
which he is entitled was based solely upon his own efforts. 
Wilderness and Hubble's arguments are all red-herrings designed to 
cause this Court to look beyond the mark. 
Initially, let's examine the policy considerations for the 
exemption law in the first place. Wilderness and Hubble admit 
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that Utah's law and federal law under the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act are "almost identical". (Wilderness and Hubble's 
Brief at page 8) Much of the interpretation of the federal law 
and also states' laws is found in issues before federal bankruptcy 
courts which must look to the applicable state law for governance. 
In the case of In re Duncan, 140 B.R. 210 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Tenn. 
1992) the court was faced with a claimed exemption for an 
insurance renewal commission that came to the debtor after he 
ceased working for the insurance company, but based upon prior 
sales. The court honored the claimed exemption (which is 
important in and of itself) but even more interesting is the 
analysis the court followed, which should be a map for this Court. 
The court said: 
The only issues before the court are the trustee's 
contentions that the exemption is available only to 
employees rather than to independent contractors such as 
the debtor, and that, even if the exemption is available 
to independent contractors, the renewal commission at 
issue do not constitute compensation for personal 
services as required by Tenn. Code Section 26-2-105 
(1980) . 
Because there is no Tennessee case law dispositive 
of either issue raised by the trustee, it is necessary 
to look to other jurisdictions for guidance. The 
analysis is made easier because state wage garnishment 
exemption statutes must comply with the federal Consumer 
Credit Protection Act. Consequently, the language of 
most state wage garnishment exemption statutes, 
Tennessee included, is substantially identical to the 
language of 15 U.S.C.A. Sections 1672 and 1673 (West 
1982) 
There is a split of authority as to whether the 
exemption statute applies to independent contractors. 
Some courts have relied on the language of the statute 
and the congressional intent behind the federal act to 
deny protection other than to wage earners in an 
employee-employer relationship. . . . However, other 
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courts, relying on identical statutory language and 
their interpretation of the congressional intent have 
extended protection to independent contractors. . . . 
This court finds the latter line of cases to be 
persuasive. 
The intent of Congress in its enactment of 
Subchapter II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is 
best stated by the Act itself. Section 1671 of title 
15, entitled "Congressional findings and declaration of 
purpose", provides in part: 
(a) The Congress finds: 
(1) The unrestricted garnishment 
of compensation due for personal services 
encourages the making of predatory extensions 
of credit. Such extensions of credit divert 
money into excessive credit payments and 
thereby hinder the production and flow of 
goods in interstate commerce. 
(2) The application of garnishment 
as a creditor's remedy frequently results in 
loss of employment by the debtor, and the 
resulting disruption of employment, 
production, and consumption constitutes a 
substantial burden on interstate commerce. 
(3) The great disparities among 
the laws of the several States relating to 
garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the 
uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and 
frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas 
of the country. 
(b) On the basis of the findings stated 
in subsection (a) of this section, the 
Congress determines that the provisions of 
this subchapter are necessary and proper for 
the purpose of carrying into execution the 
powers of the Congress to regulate commerce 
and to establish uniform bankruptcy laws. 
15 U.S.C.A. Section 1671 (West 1982) 
The Duncan court then concluded: 
Clearly, the intent of Congress in its enactment of 
Subchapter II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act was 
to grant an exemption to wage earners from the burden of 
garnishments, to protect employment of wage earners, and 
to prevent bankruptcies. It was to grant relief for the 
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wage earner debtors and "more particularly for his 
family," against economically destructive garnishments. 
• These concerns apply equally to individuals 
working as independent contractors as well as those 
engaged in traditional employee relationships. Marian 
Health Center v. Cooks, 451 N.W.2d at 848. Further, the 
language of the statute simply does not limit its effect 
to employees. "Earnings" include all compensation for 
personal services, including commissions. Tenn Code Ann. 
Section 26-2-105(1980). Therefore, the exemption is 
available to independent contractors to the extent that 
the compensation sought to be garnished is for personal 
services. (Id. at 212-213) (emphasis added) 
In the case of Matter of Glickman, 126 B.R. 124 (Bkrtcy. M.D. 
Fla. 1991) a Florida bankruptcy court also held that an 
independent contractor is entitled to the exemption, reemphasized 
the reasoning of the Duncan court, and added some of its own. 
The Statute does not limit the term "payment of any 
money or other thing due" to wages alone. The Statute 
also does not limit the term "person" to an employee as 
opposed to an independent contractor. To read the 
Statute otherwise might render it unconstitutional as 
discriminating between different classes receiving 
compensation. See White at 533. 
The purpose of the exemption laws is to prevent the 
unfortunate citizen from being deprived of the 
necessaries of life and to preserve for him and his 
family certain things reasonably necessary to enable him 
to earn a livelihood, and, where his livelihood is 
produced by his personal labor and services, to so 
protect him and his family that such earnings may not be 
taken from them and they be left destitute and a charge 
upon charity. 
The rule appears to be in almost all jurisdictions 
that exemption statutes should be liberally construed in 
favor of the debtor that the very purpose of the statute 
in preserving to the unfortunate debtor and his family 
means of living without becoming a charge upon the 
public may be accomplished. (Id. at 126) (emphasis added 
in the first paragraph only) 
The court went on to reiterate that, as in Utah, "Nothing in 
the Statute limits its operation to employees." (Id. at 126-127) 
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This interpretation of the intention of the Statutes is not 
limited to bankruptcy courts. In the case of Marian Health Center 
v. Cooks, 451 N.W.2d 846 (Iowa App. 1989) cited above, the court 
held: 
The phrase "personal services" as used by the 
legislature means wages for work done by the person. 
This was intended to distinguish it from certificates of 
deposit or other investments. The intent of the 
legislature could not have been to distinguish employees 
from independent contractors. One of the express 
purposes of the statute is to prevent bankruptcies and 
the predatory extension of credit. Garnishing an 
independent contractor's income to exhaustion will 
result in bankruptcy as surely as it will with an 
employee. . . . The income of the appellant is protected 
by the Iowa exemption law." (Id. at 848) (emphasis 
added) 
Speaking once again to the issue of renewal commissions, the 
court in First Nat. Bank of Guthrie v. Brown, 579 P.2d 825 (Okl. 
1978) held: 
We view such commissions as deferred compensation 
for making the initial sale and as an incentive to 
encourage the insurance agents to service their 
customers, in order to encourage renewals. Thus, the 
commissions constitute compensation for personal 
services, and accordingly come within the definition of 
"earnings". (Id at 827) 
There is nothing in the Utah statute that distinguishes 
between employees and independent contractors. There is nothing 
in it that mandates that "periodic earnings" must mean weekly, 
monthly, or even yearly. Remember, even the renewal commissions 
of a retired insurance agent (never an employee of the company)— 
whenever they are paid—are exempt. 
Even if the points made above were not enough, most 
persuasive is Utah law itself. In the Utah case of Russell M. 
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Miller Company v. Givan, 325 P. 2d 908 (Utah 1958) the court 
reiterated the theme represented above: 
It seems clear beyond dispute that the language of 
the statute "earnings of the judgment debtor for his 
personal services," is intended to have a broader 
application than the restrictive meaning of the phrase 
"wages of a laborer" which the plaintiff seeks to place 
thereon. This idea is implemented by the generally 
approved rule that exemption statutes are liberally 
construed in favor of the debtor to protect him and his 
family from hardship. 
The fact that the debtor may use some capital or 
credit, tools or equipment, or automobiles or other 
property as an aid in producing such income would not 
deprive him of the benefit of the exemption allowed by 
law. Even if the plaintiff had shown, as he contends, 
that part of the defendant's income was a return on 
capital investment, or that other elements than the 
efforts of the debtor actually produced part of the 
income, defendant would still be entitled to his 
exemption on the portion of his income representing 
reasonable compensation for his efforts, provided it 
could be ascertained. (Id at 909-910) 
THIS IS THE LAW IN UTAH. Not many states have their own 
controlling case-law, but Utah does, and it should be followed. 
Wilderness and Hubble have brought to this Court's attention 
the few cases that lean in favor in their theory, however, they 
fall woefully short in terms of persuasive impact. The cases 
cited by Wilderness and Hubble can be easily distinguished. 
In the case of Funk v. Utah State Tax Com'n 839 P. 2d 818 
(Utah 1992) the court dealt with the issue of whether a state tax 
refund was viewed as disposable earnings subject to the exemption. 
There the court ruled in harmony with every other court in the 
nation, including the case of Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S.642 
(1974) also cited by Wilderness and Hubble. In the Kokoszka case 
the issue was a federal income tax refund. The rationale for 
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those two cases and which does not control the issues currently 
before this Court, is articulated in the Funk case as follows: 
The Kokoszka rationale regarding the CCPA applies 
equally to the almost identical language of Rule 
64D(d)(vii). Wage earners generally do not rely on tax 
refunds as a means of support to the same extent that 
they rely on periodic payments of compensation. . . Most 
people do not budget tax refunds into their regular 
living expenses. Thus, allowing garnishment of an 
entire tax refund by creditors would not place the type 
of hardship on a debtor that Rule 64D and the CCPA seek 
to avoid. (Funk at 821) (emphasis added) 
Wilderness and Hubble stretch in every way possible to make 
the Funk and Kokoszka cases cover the factual foundation of 
Vance's claim. They suggest that "the Robinson judgment is within 
the very same class of claims" as set forth in those cases. In 
summary, Wilderness and Hubble state: "Vance's claim is clearly 
not wages, salary, or regular commission earned on a week-to-week, 
month-to-month, or even year-to-year basis." They are right. It 
isn't—but it doesn't need to be. In spite of Wilderness and 
Hubble's efforts to confuse the Court, that definition is simply 
not the standard. The standard is found in Rule 64D(d)(vii), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads: 
"Earnings" or "earnings for personal services" means 
compensation paid or payable for personal services 
whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus 
or otherwise . . . " 
Any modification or embellishment of that definition by Wilderness 
and Hubble should be ignored. 
Two other cases cited by Wilderness and Hubble in earlier 
memoranda are wholly without impact. Anticipating they may be 
added on Reply, we address them briefly here. In the case of 
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Coones v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 796 P.2d 803 (Wyo. 1990) the 
court found that profits received from the sale of livestock and 
crops were not covered by that state's exemption statute. The 
court distinguished those profits and business earnings, passed on 
only secondarily to the owners, as different from "compensation 
paid or payable for personal services", inasmuch as the owners had 
no obligation to pay themselves out of the operation of the farm 
and ranch. In our case, the obligation to pay was on a third 
party—the Robinsons—and was not controlled by Vance. 
In the case of Coward v. Smith, 636 P.2d 793 (Kan. 1981) the 
Kansas court likened Smith's independent contractor status to the 
operator of a business. Smith had hired 6 or 7 other people to 
help him in the project. The court's definition of an independent 
contractor in the Coward case was one who, 
. . .generally employs others to perform the labor 
end his compensation includes more than compensation for 
his personal services. It includes personal services 
performed by the contractor's employees, reimbursement 
for equipment used, and a return on capital." (Id. at 
796) 
Even if it were on point, the Miller v. Givan case, supra, in 
Utah specifically overrules application of that Kansas case in 
this state. If Vance is characterized as an "independent 
contractor", it is only for tax purposes. He is not the sort 
discussed in the Coward case. He has no employees; provides no 
equipment; and, does not receive a return on capital. He keeps 
what he earns as compensation for his—and only his—personal 
services. 
Vance makes his living by helping others collect debts that 
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are owed them and taking a percentage of the recovery. (See Fact 
#39, Affidavit R710) He has no assurance if, when, and how much 
will be recovered, but when it does come, it is his sole source of 
income. Some recoveries are larger than others but that is not a 
basis for denying an exemption. There is no law to that effect— 
anywhere. 
IV. REGARDLESS OF THE SEMANTICS OF GARNISHMENT OR EXECUTION, 
WILDERNESS AND HUBBLE SOUGHT THE SAME THING USING BOTH LABELS. 
WILDERNESS AND HUBBLE WAIVED ANY RIGHTS TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Wilderness and Hubble attempt to make something out of the 
fact that although a garnishment was issued, none was served. 
Instead, both before and after the issuance of the Writ of 
Garnishment, Wilderness and Hubble went directly to the Court and 
sought garnishment's equivalent—an Order of Execution against 
Vance's earnings in the possession of the Robinsons—which was 
viewed as in their September Memo (R383-387) as the same thing. 
In the September Memo Wilderness and Hubble state: 
5. Third-Party Plaintiffs assert that they are 
entitled to a garnishment order against any and all sums 
due Dennis Blaine Vance from Leon and Arlene Robinson. 
(September Memo at page 3; R385) 
They sought a garnishment order and received its equivalent 
in the Amended Order signed by this Court attaching property of 
Vance in the possession of a third party. It was not required 
that Vance be "served with a notice of execution". The Order was 
granted in open court in the presence of counsel for the Robinsons 
and Vance, personally appearing pro se. Based upon that "notice" 
in open court, followed up with the March 13, 1995, Amended Order 
30 
which was sent to Vance (without mention of his exemption rights), 
Vance filed a Request for Hearing (See Request for Hearing R712-
713). On April 14, 1995, the court initiated a telephone 
conference call with counsel for Wilderness and Hubble and Vance 
and set a timeline for briefing the issues. Memoranda were filed 
and evidence was presented by affidavits. 
On May 2, 1995, counsel for Vance filed a Notice to Submit 
for Decision requesting that the court act upon the memoranda and 
affidavits filed. Vance, as the only party having requested a 
hearing, had effectively withdrawn that request by filing the 
Notice to Submit. Copies were sent to opposing counsel. No one 
objected. No one requested a hearing. The court waited for six 
weeks—until, on June 19, 1995, the court initiated a conference 
call among all three counsel to announce its decision. A copy of 
an Order was circulated among counsel on June 19, 1995. No 
objections were filed, and three weeks later, on July 10, 1995, 
the Order was signed and entered by the court. Only now, a year 
later on appeal, do we hear Wilderness and Hubble say they "were 
never afforded the opportunity to present evidence and/or 
testimony concerning the existence or nonexistence of Vance's 
claimed entitlement...". (See Wilderness and Hubble's Brief at 
page 6, and Fact #10 at page 2) That simply is not true. They 
never sought the opportunity and did not complain thereafter— 
until this appeal. If Wilderness and Hubble were prejudiced by 
the lack of a hearing, they should begin the discussion by looking 
to themselves and their counsel. 
31 
V. EQUITY DEMANDS EQUITY 
It appears rather clear from the file that the trial court 
felt a need to penalize Vance—but only after it had first 
penalized Wilderness and Hubble. Now Wilderness and Hubble 
innocently point to Vance as "the perpetrator and orchestrator of 
a scheme to defraud all of the parties in this case". (Wilderness 
and Hubble's Brief at page 14) Wilderness and Hubble are 
attempting to sway the Court's emotions beyond the boundaries of 
the law by suggesting that there is "a very strong policy 
consideration against the allowance of Vance's claim". 
(Wilderness and Hubble's Brief at page 14) What Wilderness and 
Hubble seem to forget, and one would hope is not lost on this 
Court, is that it was Wilderness and Hubble who were found to have 
defrauded the Robinsons in the first instance. Furthermore, the 
same judge who found against Vance on the underlying claim, 
maturely distanced himself from his feelings toward Vance and 
ruled that Vance was entitled to an exemption as a matter of law. 
In their final attack, Wilderness and Hubble conclude their 
Brief with: "To allow him to escape the economic consequences of 
his wrongful acts, and indeed compensate him therefore (sic), goes 
against every tenet of fairness and justice." This is the pot 
calling the kettle "black". A large judgment remains in place 
against Vance and is sufficient punishment. By denying Vance the 
minimum protection of his statutorily granted exemption, this 
Court would be allowing Wilderness and Hubble to benefit further 
from their fraud. 
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One demanding equity from a Court must have clean hands 
himself. Equity demands equity. Even if equity were rightfully 
deserved, which it is not, such cannot override the statutory 
right Vance has to this Court's protection of his exemption from 
execution. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, Vance respectfully requests that 
this Court either refuse to hear this appeal based upon the July 
Order, or, if addressed, to affirm the, careful, methodical, and 
mature decision of the trial court and award Vance his costs, 
which include damages, doubled, and his reasonable attorney fees 
in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 ~~ day of June, 1996. 
STOKER & SWINTON 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellee by depositing two copies 
thereof in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, this 7 -day of June, 
1996, addressed as follows: 
Kent L. Christiansen 
Christiansen & Sonntag 
Attorneys for Appellants 
345 IBM Plaza 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake Yj lh 84111 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
EXHWT k 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBINSON, LEON W 
VS 
GNEITING, KAY 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 920902754 CV 
DATE 04/17/95 
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK DAG 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
TELEPHONE CALL WITH THE COURT, KENT CHRISTIANSEN & JEFF SWINTON 
COUNSEL AGREE THERE IS A DISPUTE AS TO THE LAW AND ENTER 
A STIPULATION THAT THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF'S TO RESPOND BY 
04-24-95 TO INITIAL THIRD-PARTY MEMORANDUM AND ANSWER TO BY 
04-28-95. THE COURT WILL THEN RULE IN THE LAW AND THE PARTIES 
WILL DETERMINE IF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY. 
D9723 
EXHIBIT "B" 
EXHIBIT B 
Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178 
STOKER & SWINTON 
Attorneys for Third Party 
Defendant Dennis Vance 
311 South State Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-4000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEON W. ROBINSON and 
ARLENE ROBINSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC. 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS VANCE, 
Third Party Defendant. 
COMES NOW, Dennis Vanoe, by and through his attorney of 
record, Jeffrey C. Swinton, of the law firm of Stoker & Swinton, 
and respectfully requests this Court to act upon the Memoranda on 
file herein regarding the exemption claim of Dennis Vance. The 
matter has now been fully briefed and is ready for this Court's 
consideration. 
j-11 — ~\ 
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NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
FOR 
DECISION 
Civil No. 920902754 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
0 h o s U o 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of May, 1995. 
STOKER & SWINTON 
/xnton 
Third Party 
idant Dennis Vance 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby verifies that on the ZJ*- day of May, 
1995, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to Submit was 
mailed by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Kent L. Christiansen 
Christiansen & Sonntag 
420 E. South Temple, #345 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Scott B. Mitchell 
Lehman, Jensen & Donahue 
8 East 300 South, #620 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael G. Barker 
56 East Broadway, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -, 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178 
STOKER & SWINTON 
Attorneys for Third Party 
Defendant Dennis Vance 
311 South State Street, Suite 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-4000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEON W. ROBINSON and 
ARLENE ROBINSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC. 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS VANCE, 
Third Party Defendant. 
COMES NOW, Dennis Vance, by and through his counsel, and 
requests an Order from this Court compelling compliance with its 
Order dated July 10, 1995 ("Order") and fixing the amount of cash 
to which Vance is entitled thereunder. 
On July 10, 1995, this Court signed an Order which created a 
formula for determining the exemption to which Vance was entitled. 
EXHIBIT G 
AUG 1 7 1225 
400 
REQUEST FOR COMPLIANCE 
ORDER AND DETERMINATION 
OF ACCOUNTING TO FIX 
EXEMPTION FOR VANCE 
Civil No. 920902754 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
it .0 ti "U 8 4 <i 
A copy of that Order is attached hereto % as Exhibit "A" and 
specifically required that the parties "attempt to determine, agree 
and divide among themselves the amounts to be paid to or retained 
by each, Robinsons, Vande, and Hubble." 
On July 10, 1995, counsel for Vance sent a letter to counsel 
for Robinsons and Hubble, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B". In response, counsel for Robinsons sent a letter on 
July 12, 1995, to counsel for Hubble, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "C". On July 13, 1995, counsel for Hubble sent 
a letter to counsel for Vance, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit "D". On July 14, 1995, counsel for Vance responded to the 
July 13th letter and gave counsel for Hubble until July 19, 1995, 
to obtain his clients' cooperation to share information from their 
confidential agreement sufficient to allow compliance with this 
Court's Order. (See Exhibit "E") 
Follow-up conversations have produced nothing except the 
confirmation from counsel for Robinsons that their attorneys fees 
totalled $19,140.66. Vance is entitled to his exemption and cash 
is being wrongfully retained by either counsel for Hubble or 
Robinsons. 
Therefore, Vance respectfully requests this Court to do the 
following: 
1. Require counsel for Hubble and Robinsons to disclose the 
total amount of consideration passing pursuant to the confidential 
agreement (coupled with prior garnishments) referred to among the 
parties. 
2 
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2. After determining the total consideration paid by Hubble 
to the Robinsons, multiplying that figure by 40% to determine the 
fee to which Vance was entitled. 
3. After determining the fee to which Vance is entitled, 
subtracting therefrom $19,140.66 for the attorney's fees and costs 
paid to Robinsons' counsel as required by paragraph 2 of the Order. 
4. After determining the balance to which Vance is entitled 
after payment of the attorneys fees and costs, determining the 
amount of the remainder which is "disposable earnings" under Utah 
Law, allowing a deduction for the amounts required by law to be 
withheld from a sole proprietor for taxes, and awarding Vance that 
specific amount. 
5. After deducting the amount paid to/ Vance for taxes, 
multiplying the remainder by 25% to determine the amount to which 
Hubble is entitled and ordering the remaining 75% to be paid 
forthwith to Vance. 
6. Granting Vance his attorney's fees and costs for the time 
required in bringing this Request and interest on the amount 
awarded accruing from July 10, 1995 until paid in full. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (5^day of August, 1995. 
STOKER & SWINTON 
Jeffrey tr. Y^winton 
A^tornew^tor Dennis Vance 
3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING* 
The undersigned hereby verifies that on the / £ - day of 
August, 1995, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Request was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Kent L. Christiansen 
Christiansen & Sonntag 
420 E. South Temple, #345 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Scott B. Mitchell 
Lehman, Jensen & Donahue 
8 East 300 South, #620 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
£\ S 
^ D I S T R I C T COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178 
STOKER & SWINTON 
Attorneys for Third Party 
Defendant Dennis Vance 
311 South State Stre'et, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-4000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEON W. ROBINSON and 
ARLENE ROBINSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC. 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS VANCE, 
Third Party Defendant. 
TKis matter was presented by Memoranda filed by Jeffrey C. 
Swinton of the law firm of Stoker & Swinton, on behalf of the 
movant, Third Party Defendant, Dennis Vance ("Vance"), with 
responsive Memoranda filed by Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm 
of Christiansen & Sonntag on behalf of Third Party Plaintiffs, 
Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. ("Hubble"), 
0 0
^ * BhuHi A 
.Mil 1 0)995 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By 
Onnuly Ctork 
ORDER ON CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
OF DENNIS VANCE 
Civil No. 920902754 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
and by Scott Mitchell on behalf of Plaintiffs, Leon and Arlene 
Robinson ("Robinsons"). 
The Court, in a conference call in which all three counsel 
participated on June 19, 1995, announced its decision. The Court 
having read all Memoranda and being fully advised in the premises, 
and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that, 
1. The commission to which Dennis Vance is entitled under 
his agreement with the Robinsons is "earnings from personal 
services" within the meaning of Rule 64D(d)(vii), URCP; 
2. This Court requires the deduction of all amounts owed to 
Robinsons by Vance for their attorneys' fees and costs under their 
agreement with Vance to be deducted before arriving at the amount 
of Vance's "disposable earnings" within the meaning of Rule 
64D(d)(vii), URCP; 
3. The maximum amount of Vance's aggregate disposable 
earnings available for attachment or garnishment by Hubble is 
"twenty-five per centum" of his "disposable earnings" calculated in 
accordance with this Order under Rule 64D(d)(viii)(A), URCP; and, 
4. The parties shall attempt to determine, agree and divide 
among themselves the amounts to be paid to or retained by each, 
Robinsons, Vance, and Hubble. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
V 
The undersigned hereby verifies that on the (^  - day of 
June, 1995, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was 
mailed by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Kent L. Christiansen 
Christiansen & Sonntag 
420 E. South Temple, #345 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Scott B. Mitchell 
Judge Building, Suite 620 
8 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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STEPHEN G. STOKER. P.C. 
JEFFREY C. SWIIMTON. P.C. 
LAW OFFICES 
STOKER & SWINTON 
k PARTNERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET. SUITE * C O 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH S A I I I 
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 0 3 5 9 - 4 0 0 0 
TELECOPIER 
I S 0 U 3 S 9 - 6 6 0 3 
July 10, 1995 
Kent L. Christiansen 
Christiansen & Sonntag 
420 E South Temple, #345 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Scott B. Mitchell 
Judge Building, Suite 620 
8 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Kent and Scott: 
Enclosed please find the Order which I sent to you on the 19th 
of June, 1995 which has now been signed on the! 10th of July, 1995 
by Judge Wilkinson. 
As you were aware, the court has asked that we determine, 
agree and divide among ourselves the amounts to be paid or retained 
by each of our clients. In light of this I would appreciate 
knowing the details of the settlement agreement between your 
clients and the amount of consideration given the Robinsons. 
Please communicate with me before Friday, July 14. 
Sincerely, 
SWINTON 
JCS:js 
Enclosure 
ccz Dennis Vance 
•fl'(M*S5 1 EXHIBIT « < 
Scott B. Mitchell 
<z/ft£oiruu at Jlavj 
SUITE 620 JUDGE BUILDING 
8 EAST 300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
 w i p ^ o i r B #<m4 x o e o 4 _. c 
TELEPHONE: (801) 532-7858 TELECOPIER: (801) 363-1715 
July 12, 1995 
Kent L. Christiansen 
420 E. South Temple, Suite 345 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Hubble v. Vance 
Dear Kent: 
In response to Jeff Swinton's letter of July 10, 1995, and 
in accordance with the Stipulated Settlement, Satisfaction, and 
Release of .All Claims on file with the court, you are hereby 
notified of; Vance's demand for details regarding our clients1 
settlement agreement. At your earliest convenience, please let 
me know how you intend to respond. 
SBM:km 
cc: Jeffrey Swinton 
. Mitchel l 
0 U 0 8 5 2 EXHIBIT C 
KENTL CHRISTIANSENf 
JAMES L SONNTAG* 
SYLVIA O KRALIK 
LUCYL SONNTAG* 
RANDY J CHRISTIANSEN 
of Counsel 
LAW OFFICES 
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG 
345 IBM PLAZA 
420 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (801) 359 3762 
FACSIMILE (801) 359 3763 
fALSO ADMITTED TO THE 
COLORADO BAR 
^REGISTERED PATENT 
ATTORNEY ALSO ADMITTED 
TO THE NEW YORK BAR 
•REGISTERED PATENT 
AGENT NOT ADMITTED 
TO THE BAR 
July 13, 1995 
Jeffrey C. Swinton 
STOKER & SWINTON 
311 South State Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Dennis Vance 
Dear Jeff: 
Thank you for your letter of July 10, 1995. I have discussed the substance of your letter 
with my clients and they, have expressed to me their need for verifipation of any agreement that 
existed between Vance and the Robinsons. In addition, there was a confidentiality provision in 
the settlement agreement that still needs to be addressed. 
I would appreciate receiving a copy of the signed agreement between Vance and the 
Robinsons evidencing his claim for compensation, and any other documentation or verification 
that such an agreement indeed existed. Thank you for your cooperation and assistance in this 
matter. I look forward to hearing from you. 
Very truly yours^  
CHRISTIANSEN^ SONNTAG 
KLC/br 
d!M;c - c EXHIBIT I! 
STEPHEN G. STOKER P.C. 
JEFFREY C. SWINTON. P.C. 
LAW OFFICES 
S T O K E R & S W I N T O N
 % 
k, PARTNERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET. SUITE AOO 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH & 4 I I I 
TELEPHONE ISOI) 3 5 ^ - 4 0 0 0 
TELECOPIER 
<80J)359 -e603 
July 14, '1995 
Kent L. Christiansen 
Christiansen & Sonntag 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Wilderness Building Systems vs. Vance 
Dear Kent: 
I'm in receipt of your letter of July 13, 1995. The Agreement 
between Vance and the Robinsons was an oral agreement entered into 
with full knowledge of Scott Mitchell, attorney for the Robinsons. 
Pursuant to that Agreemertt Mr. Vance was to'receive 40% of all 
amounts recovered by the Robinsons after a judgment was entered 
against Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, subject to an 
offset for attorney's fees as set forth in the Response to Claim of 
Exemption filed by Scott Mitchell, a copy of which is enclosed 
herewith. 
Relative to the confidentiality provision of the Settlement 
Agreement, I'm asking that you and Mr. Mitchell agree between 
yourselves and your clients to share the Settlement Agreement with 
me and mine. Judge Wilkinson expects us to work this out among us 
however failing that, I will immediately present the matter back to 
him for additional enforcement. 
Please let me know no later than Wednesday, July 19 if your 
clients are willing to cooperate with the Courts' Order which says 
that "the parties shall attempt to determine, agree and divide 
among themselves the amounts to be paid to or retained by each, 
Robinsons, Vance and Hubble." Your cooperation is appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
JpFREY^CT^WINTON 
JCS:js 
Enclosure 
cc: Dennis Vance 
ft 11 i) :• U 4 EXHIBIT E 
EXHIBIT "D" 
EXHIBIT D 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBINSON, LEON W 
vs 
GNEITING, KAY 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 920902754 CV 
DATE 10/12/95 
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK WTF 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
IN-COURT CONFERENCE 
P. ATTY. MITCHELL, SCOTT B 
D. ATTY. CHRISTIANSEN, K & SWINTON, J 
THIS CASE COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING (IN 
CHAMBERS) , WITH APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE. BASED ON DIS-
CUSSION WITH RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, THE COURT ORDERS THE SETTLE-
MENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES BE DISCLOSED, HOWEVER IT 
IS TO BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AS TO THE ATTORNEY'S FOR ROBINSON, 
GNEITING, AND VANCE. THE PARTIES AGREED ON FORMULA, AND 
JUDGMENTS WERE DETERMINED. MR. SWINTON TO PREPARE THE JUDG-
MENT. 
0 0 0 8 7 S 
EXHIBIT "E" 
EXHIBIT E 
Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178 
STOKER & SWINTON 
Attorneys for Third Party 
Defendant Dennis Vance 
311 South State Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-4000 
JUDGEMENT 
By 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2.4 1995 
LT/GAKE COUNTY-^ 
Deputy ClOfk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEON W. ROBINSON and 
ARLENE ROBINSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC. 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS VANCE, 
Third Party Defendant. 
JUDGMENT ON CLAIM OF 
OF DENNIS VANCE 
aao3Tu 
Civil No. 920902754 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The matter of determining the amount of the exemption to which 
Dennis Vance is entitled based upon this Court's Order of July 10, 
1995, was presented by Memoranda filed by Jeffrey C. Swinton of the 
law firm of Stoker & Swinton, on behalf of the movant, Third Party 
Defendant, Dennis Vance ("Vance"), with responsive Memoranda filed 
by Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm of Christiansen & Sonntag 
on behalf of Third Party Plaintiffs, Kerry Rick Hubble and 
Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. ("Hubble"), and by Scott Mitchell 
(K^ 
on behalf of Plaintiffs, Leon and Arlene Robinson ("Robinsons"), as 
well as in oral argument in a Hearing held on October 12, 1995, 
with all three counsel in attendance. 
Based upon the Memoranda and Arguments, this Court has ordered 
the attorneys for Hubble and Robinson to disclose the amount of 
consideration set forth in the March 16, 1995, Settlement Agreement 
between Hubble and Robinsons to the Court and ordered them and 
counsel for Vance to maintain that figure in confidence between 
them alone. The Court further denied Vance's claim for recovery of 
attorney's fees. Having therefore read the Memoranda, heard oral 
arguments and received information regarding the amount of final 
settlement; 
THIS COURT HEREBY ENTERS JUDGMENT FOR THE AMOUNT OF THE 
EXEMPTION IN FAVOR OF DENNIS VANCE, AND AGAINST KERRY RICK HUBBLE, 
AND WILDERNESS BUILDING SYSTEMS, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, in the 
amount of $12,057.37, plus pre-judgment interest accruing from 
March 16, 1995, to October 12, 1995, at the statutory rate of 10% 
per annum for an additional amount of $693.71. The TOTAL JUDGMENT 
is therefore $12,751.08. 
Interest shall continue to accrue on the Total Judgment amount 
from October 12, 1995, until paid in full at the post-judgment rate 
of 9.22% per annum. 
MADE AND ENTERED THIS X \ DAY OF OCTOBER, 1995. 
BY TttE COURT: 
/Homer F. Wilkinson 
/ D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE« 
The undersigned hereby verifies that on the [ 2^ day of 
October, 1995, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment 
was transmitted via Facsimile to the following: 
Kent L. Christiansen 
Christiansen & Sonntag 
420 E. South Temple, #345 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
359-3763 
Scott B. Mitchell 
175 South Main Street 
Suite 1112 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
359-5473 
3 
EXHIBIT "F" 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33 
667 UTAH KUlxkfc <jr A r r n . i j j u / \ i J D n v w u D i / u n u 
all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the 
appeal and necessary to the final determination of the case. 
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of convic-
tion is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless otherwise 
specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other 
order is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order affirmed 
or modified shall be executed. 
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry of decision. 
When a judgment, decree, or order is reversed, modified, or the 
reasons shall be stated concisely in writing and filed with the 
clerk. Any justice or judge concurring or dissenting may 
likewise give reasons in writing and file the same with the 
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall 
constitute the entry of the judgment of the court. 
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argument, 
the /court concludes that a case satisfies the criteria set forth in 
Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the case by order without written 
opinion. The decision shall have only such effect as precedent 
as is provided for by Rule 31(f). 
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the entry of the 
decision, the clerk shall give notice to the respective parties 
and make the decision public in accordance with the direction 
of the court. 
(Amended effective October 1,1992.) 
Rule 31. Expedited appeals decided after oral argu-
ment without written opinion. 
(a) Motion and stipulation for expedited hearing. Af-
ter the filing of all briefs in an appeal, a party may move for an 
expedited decision without a written opinion. The motion shall 
be in the form prescribed by Rule 23 and shall describe the 
nature of the case, the issues presented and any special 
reasons the parties may have for an expedited decision. The 
court may dispose of any qualified case under this rule upon 
its own motion before or after oral argument. 
(b) Cases which qualify for expedited decision. The 
following are matters which the court may consider for expe-
dited decision without opinion: 
(1) appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues 
based primarily on documents; 
(2) summary judgments; 
(3) dismissals for failure to state a claim; 
(4) dismissals for lack of personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction; and 
(5) judgments or orders based on uncomplicated issues 
of law. 
(c) In all motions brought under this rule, the substantive 
rules of law should be deemed settled, although the parties 
may differ as to their application. 
(d) Appeals ineligible for expedited decision. The 
court will not grant a motion for an expedited appeal in cases 
raising substantial constitutional issues, issues of significant 
public interest, issues of law of first impression, or compli-
cated issues of fact or law. 
(e) Procedure if expedited motion is granted. If a 
tnotion for expedited decision is granted, the appeal will be 
given an expedited setting for oral argument within 45 to 60 
days from the date of the order granting the motion. Within 
two days after submission of the appeal, the court will confer-
ence, decide the case, and issue a written order which need not 
be accompanied by an opinion. Entry of the order by the clerk 
in the records of the court, shall constitute the entry of the 
judgment of the court. 
(f) Effect as precedent. Appeals decided under this rule 
will not stand as precedent, but, in other respects, will have 
the same force and effect as other decisions of the court. 
(g) Issuance of written opinion. If it appears to the court 
after the case has been submitted for decision that a written 
opinion should be issued, the time limitation in paragraph (e) 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 32. Interest on judgment. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money 
in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law 
shall be payable from the date the judgment was entered in 
the trial court. 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recov-
ery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines 
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court 
may order that the damages be paid by the pfcrty or by the 
party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based 
on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose 
such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of 
litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing 
the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any 
party or upon its own motion. A party may request 
damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's 
motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a 
motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the 
court, the court shall issue to the party or the party's 
attorney or both an order to show cause why such dam-
ages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall 
set forth the allegations which form the basis of the 
damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond 
unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The order 
to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may 
be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing. 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) l b whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by 
law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the 
appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by 
the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be 
taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judg-
ment or order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the 
appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is 
affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be 
allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or 
taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases 
involving the state of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an 
award of costs for or against the state shall be at the discretion 
of the court unless specifically required or prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds 
and other expenses on appeal. The following may be taxed 
as costs in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal: the 
actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or memoranda 
and attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual 
costs incurred in the preparation and transmission of the 
record, including costs of the reporter's transcript unless 
otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid for superse-
deas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the 
fees for filincr and docketing the appeal. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) 
Rule 59 U T A H K U L U i O U r ^ lVIJL* Jrxv^r^i^i^wxvjLj 
Role 59. New trials; amendments of j u d g m e n t 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has 
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclu-
sions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of 
discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or 
more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any 
general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question 
submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determina-
tion by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct 
may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with reason-
able diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or preju-
dice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7} Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be 
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a 
new trial is made under Subdivision (aXD, (2), (3), or (4), it 
shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new 
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the 
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to eerve opposing affidavits. The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may 
be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days 
either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by 
written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a 
new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new 
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the 
grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to al ter or amend a judgment . A motion to 
alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 
days after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, 
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at 
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc* On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
-x , -,w^v / m / . j / . . .v..iU— k A ^ A f n « sUnrunmntorl intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospec-
tive application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does 
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evi-
dence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in 
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, 
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears 
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment. 
(a) Stay upon ent ry of judgment . Execution or other 
proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue immediately 
upon the entry of the judgment, unless the court in its 
discretion and on such conditions for the security of the 
adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment In its 
discretion and on such conditions for the security of the 
adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the execution 
of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the 
disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a 
judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief 
from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a 
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed 
verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amend-
ment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant 
to Rule 62(b). 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken 
from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, 
or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may 
suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the 
pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it considers 
proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken 'the 
appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, 
unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these 
rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing the 
notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas 
bond is approved by the court. 
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When 
an appeal is taken by the United States, the state of Utah, or 
an officer or agency of either, or by direction of any department 
of either, and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is 
stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be required 
from the appellant. 
(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where the defen-
dant is adjudged guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlaw-
fully holding public office, civil or military, within this state, 
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(i) Examination of defendant or th i rd party. The de-
fendant may be required to attend before the court or a master 
appointed by the court, to be examined on oath respecting his 
property. Any person owing debts to the defendant, or having 
in his possession or under his control any credits or other 
personal property belonging to the defendant, may likewise be 
required to appear before the court or a master and be 
examined respecting the same. The court or master, after any 
examination conducted pursuant to this subdivision, may 
order personal property capable of manual delivery to be 
delivered to the officer, on such terms as may be just, having 
reference to any liens thereon or claims against the same, and 
may require a memorandum to be given of all other personal 
property, containing the amount and description thereof. The 
court may make quch provision for witness fees and mileage as 
may be just, provided that if any third party has refused to 
give the officer executing the writ a memorandum of any debts 
or credits, requested under the provisions of Subdivision (h) of 
this rule, such party may be required to pay the costs of any 
proceeding taken for the purpose of obtaining such informa-
tion. 
(j) Sale of a t tached proper ty before judgment . 
(1) Where property is perishable. If any of the 
property attached is perishable, the officer must sell the 
same in the manner in which such property is sold on 
execution. The proceeds and other property attached by 
him must be retained by him to answer any judgment 
that may be recovered in the action, unless released or 
discharged, or subjected to execution upon another judg-
ment recovered previous to issuing the attachment. 
(2) Other property. Whenever property has been 
taken by an officer under a writ of attachment, and it is 
made to appear satisfactorily to the court that the interest 
of the parties to the action will be subserved by a sale 
thereof, the court may order such property sold in the 
same manner as property sold under an execution, and 
the proceeds to be deposited in the court to abide the 
judgment in the action. Such order can be made only upon 
notice to the adverse party, in case such party has been 
personally served in the action. 
(k) Satisfaction of judgment; deficiency; redelivery of 
property. If judgment is recovered by the plaintiff, the officer 
must satisfy the same out of the property attached by him 
which has not been delivered to the defendant or a claimant as 
herein provided, or subjected to a prior lien, if it is sufficient 
for that purpose, by paying to the plaintiff the proceeds of all 
sales of perishable property sold by him, or of any debts or 
credits collected by him or so much as shall be necessary to 
satisfy the judgment; and, if any balance remains due and an 
execution shall have been issued on the judgment, by selling 
under the execution so much of the property, real or personal, 
as may be necessary to satisfy the balance, if enough for that 
purpose remains in his hands. Notice of the sales must be 
given and the sales conducted as in other cases of sales on 
execution. If, after selling all the property attached by him 
remaining in his hands and after deducting his fees and 
applying the proceeds, together with the proceeds of any debts 
or credits collected by him, to the payment of the judgment, 
any balance shall remain due, the officer must proceed to 
collect the same as upon an execution in other cases. When-
ever the judgment shall have been paid, the officer, upon 
reasonable demand, must deliver to the defendant the at-
tached property remaining in his hands and any proceeds of 
the property attached unapplied on the judgment. 
(1) Proceedings where defendant prevails. If the defen-
dant recovers judgment against the plaintiff, any undertaking 
received in the action, all the proceeds of sales and money 
collected by the officer and all the property attached remain-
attachment shall be discharged and the property released 
therefrom. 
(m) Liability of th i rd persons after at tachment. All 
persons having in their possession or under their control any 
credits or other personal property belonging to the defendant, 
or owing any debts to the defendant at the time of service upon 
them of a copy of the writ of attachment shall be, unless such 
property is delivered up or transferred or such debts are paid 
to the officer, liable to the plaintiff for the amount of such 
credits, property or debts, until the attachment is discharged, 
or such debts, credits, or other personal property are released 
from the attachment, or until any judgment recovered by the 
plaintiff is satisfied. Payment of such debts, or delivery or 
transfer of such property or debts, to the officer shall be 6 
sufficient discharge for the same as to the defendant. 
(n) Release of a t tachment upon real property. When-
ever an order has been made discharging or releasing an 
attachment upon real property, a certified copy of such order 
must be filed in the office of the county recorder in which the 
notice of attachment has been filed, and shall be indexed in 
like manner. 
(o) Attachment before matur i ty of claim. A party may 
commence an action upon an obligation before it is due and 
have an attachment against the property of the debtor upon 
any one or more of the grounds set forth in Subdivisions (a)(4), 
(5), (6) and (7) of this rule. The property attached, or its 
proceeds, shall be held subject to the judgment thereafter to be 
rendered; but no judgment shall be rendered on such claim 
until the obligation shall by its terms become due. 
Rule 64D. Garnishment. 
(a) Availability of wri t of garnishment (Pre-judgment 
and after judgment) . Except as provided in Rule 64A and as 
authorized and permitted therein a writ of garnishment is 
available as provided for herein. 
(i) Before judgment . A writ of garnishment is avail-
able as a means of attachment before judgment, other 
than for defendant's earnings from personal services as 
hereinafter defined in Subdivision (dXvii), at any time 
after the filing of a complaint in cases in which a writ of 
attachment is available under Rule 64C. 
(ii) After judgment or order. A writ of garnishment 
is available in aid of execution to satisfy a money judg-
ment or other order requiring the payment of money. Such 
judgments and orders are hereinafter sometimes referred 
to collectively as "judgment". 
(iii) Property subject to garnishment. The property 
subject to garnishment that a writ may be used to levy 
upon or affect is all the accrued credits, chattels, goods, 
effects, debts, choses in action, money and other personal 
property and rights to property of the defendant in the 
possession of a third person, or under the control or 
constituting a performance obligation to the defendant of 
any third person, whether due or yet to become due at the 
time of service of the writ of garnishment, which are not 
exempt from garnishment or exempt under any applicable 
provisions of state or federal law (hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as "Property Subject to Garnishment"). 
(iv) As used in this Rule 64D, the term "plaintiff' 
means the person or entity seeking by garnishment to 
attach or execute upon the property of another subject to 
garnishment and the term "defendant" means the person 
or entity whose property subject to garnishment is sought 
to be attached or executed upon by the plaintiff. 
(b) Requirements for issuance of a prejudgment writ 
of garnishment. The clerk shall issue a prejudgment writ or 
writs of garnishment, with or without notice to the defendant, 
directed to the person(s) sought to be charged as garnishee(s) 
and so identified in the affidavit required by Subdivision (b)(i) 
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filed. Several writs may be issued at the same time so long as 
there is only one named garnishee in a single writ. No writ 
shall issue unless there is attached thereto the fee required by 
Subdivision (dXii). Subject to Rule 64A, the court shall issue 
its order for the issuance of a prejudgment writ of garnish-
ment only upon the occurrence of the following: 
(i) A finding that the plaintiff has filed with the clerk 
an affidavit briefly setting forth: admissible evidence of 
facts showing that plaintiff's claim is one for which 
attachment is authorized by Rule 64C; the amount due 
the plaintiff for which the complaint seeks judgment; that 
plaintiff has good reason to believe and does believe that 
defendant has Property Subject to Garnishment in the 
possession or in the control of or otherwise owing from one 
or more specified third persons who plaintiff seeks to 
charge as garnishees or that such third persons plaintiff 
seeks to charge as garnishees are otherwise indebted to 
the defendant; and that such Property Subject to Garnish-
ment is not earnings for the personal services of the 
defendant, or otherwise exempt from garnishment. 
(ii) A finding that plaintiff has filed with the clerk a 
bond or undertaking in the form and amount required for 
the issuance of a writ of attachment. 
(iii) Exceptions to the sufficiency of the sureties on 
plaintiff's prejudgment garnishment bond or undertaking 
and the justification of such sureties shall be made within 
the times and in the manner and with the effect provided 
in Rule 64C(c). 
(c) Requirements for issuance of writ of garnishment 
after judgment or other order. After the entry of a judg-
ment or other order requiring the payment of money, the clerk 
of any court from which execution thereon may be issued shall 
issue a writ or writs of garnishment, without the necessity for 
an undertaking, upon the filing of an application by the 
plaintiff: (i) identifying the person sought to be charged as a 
garnishee; (ii) stating whether such property consists in whole 
or in part of earnings from personal services as hereinafter 
defined in Subdivision (dXvii) of this rule and (iii) stating the 
remaining amount due on the judgment. Several writs may be 
issued at the same time so long as there is only one named 
garnishee in a single writ. No writ shall issue unless there is 
attached thereto the fee required by Subdivision (dXii). 
(d) Content and effect of writ; to whom directed 
(Pre-judgment or after judgment). 
(i) The writ of garnishment shall be issued in the name 
of the State of Utah and shall be directed to the person or 
persons designated in the plaintiff's affidavit or applica-
tion as garnishee or garnishees, advising each such per-
son that each is attached as garnishee in the action, and 
commanding each of them not to pay or deliver any 
non-exempt Property Subject to Garnishment as defined 
in Subdivision (aXiii) herein in their possession, custody 
or control, or part thereof, due or to become due to the 
defendant up to the amount remaining due on the judg-
ment (Subdivision (cXiii)) if the writ is issued after 
judgment or the amount claimed to be due the plaintiff 
(Subdivision (bXi)) if a prejudgment writ is issued, which-
ever is applicable, and to retain possession and control of 
all such property until further order of the court or as 
otherwise discharged or released as provided for herein. 
In the case of a prejudgment writ, the writ shall contain a 
designation that it is a prejudgment writ and further note 
the date and time of expiration of the writ. At the time the 
writ of garnishment is issued, the clerk shall attach to the 
writ a notice of garnishment and exemptions, interroga-
tories to the garnishee and two copies of an application by 
which the defendant may request a hearing. 
(ii) The writ shall require the garnishee to give an-
the date of service of the writ. Service of a copy of the 
answers to interrogatories shall be made upon the plain-
tiff and the original filed with the clerk. The plaintiff shall 
provide a $10.00 fee to the garnishee. The interrogatories 
may in substance inquire: (1) whether the garnishee is 
indebted to the defendant, either in property or in money, 
whether the same is now due and, if not, when it is to 
become due; (2) whether there is any Property Subject to 
Garnishment in the possession, custody or control of the 
garnishee and, if so, the value of the same; (3) whether the 
garnishee knows of any debts owing to the defendant, 
whether due or not, or of any Property Subject to Gar-
nishment belonging to the defendant or in which defen-
dant has an interest, whether in the possession or under 
the control of the garnishee or another, and, if so, the 
particulars thereof; (4) whether the garnishee is retaining 
or deducting any amount in satisfaction of a claim the 
garnishee has against the plaintiff or the defendant, a 
designation as to whom such claim relates, and the 
amount retained or deducted; and (5) as to any other 
relevant information plaintiff may desire, including de-
fendant's job, position or occupation, defendant's rate and 
method of compensation, defendant's pay period and the 
computation of the amount of defendant's accrued dispos-
able earnings attached by the writ. 
(iii) If the garnishee has possession, custody or control 
of Property Subject to Garnishment, the garnishee shall 
serve within five (5) business days of service of the writ of 
garnishment upon the garnishee a copy of the writ of 
garnishment, answers to interrogatories, notice of gar-
nishment and exemptions, and two copies of an applica-
tion by which a hearing may be requested, upon: (1) the 
defendant at the last known address of the defendant 
shown on the records of the garnishee at the time the writ 
of garnishment was served on the garnishee; and (2) upon 
any other person shown upon the records of the garnishee 
to be a co-owner or having an interest in the property or 
money garnisheed at the last known address of the 
co-owner or other interested person as shown on the 
records of the garnishee at the time the writ of garnish-
ment was served on the garnishee. If that which is 
garnisheed is an account, such as a bank account or the 
like, the copies of the writ of garnishment, answers to 
interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions, 
and applications for hearing shall be served at the ad-
dresses maintained in the records of the garnishee for 
that account. Service shall be by first class mail or by 
hand delivery to the defendant and all others. In the 
answer to interrogatories, the garnishee shall state that 
the garnishee has mailed or hand delivered a copy of the 
writ of garnishment, answers to interrogatories, notice of 
garnishment and exemptions, and two copies of an appli-
cation by which a hearing may be requested to the 
defendant qnd all other persons entitled thereto and state 
the manner and date of compliance therewith. 
(iv) The notice of garnishment and exemptions that is 
to be served upon the defendant and others entitled to its 
receipt shall indicate in substance that certain money is 
exempt from garnishment including but not limited to, 
Social Security benefits, Supplemental Security Income 
benefits, Veterans' benefits, unemployment benefits, 
Workers' Compensation benefits, public assistance (wel-
fare), alimony, child support, certain pensions, and part or 
all of wages or other earnings from personal services. The 
notice shall also indicate that the defendant or other 
person notified must request a hearing within ten days 
from the date of service of the notice upon the defendant 
or other person, but in no case later than the time at 
—L^U *u« * ,^vv4 A^flfo tH« Htsnosition of the Prooerty 
605 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 64D 
Subject to Garnishment provided for herein, which 6hall 
not be sooner than ten (10) days from the service of the 
notice, if such defendant or other person desires to claim 
any exemption that has not already been reflected in the 
answers to interrogatories, believes that the writ of gar-
nishment was issued improperly, or that the answers to 
interrogatories are inaccurate. For purposes of this pro-
vision, the date of service shall be the date of mailing, if 
mailed, or date of delivery, if hand-delivered, and no 
period for mailing (Rule 6(e)) shall be used in computing 
the time period. 
(v) Priority among writs of garnishment served upon a 
garnishee shall be in order of their service. 
(vi) A writ of garnishment attaching earnings for per-
sonal services shall attach only that portion of the defen-
dant's accrued and unpaid disposable earnings hereinaf-
ter specified. The writ shall so advise the garnishee and 
shall direct the garnishee to withhold from the defen-
dant's accrued disposable earnings only the amount at-
tached pursuant to the writ. Earnings for personal ser-
vices shall be deemed to accrue on the last day of the 
period in which they were earned or to which they relate. 
If the writ is served before or on the date the defendant's 
earnings accrue and before the same have been paid to the 
defendant, the writ shall be deemed to have been served 
at the time the periodic earnings accrued; 
(vii) "Earnings" or "earnings from personal services'* 
means compensation paid or payable for personal ser-
vices, whether denominated as wages, salary, commis-
sion, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments 
pursuant to a pension or retirement program. "Disposable 
earnings" means that part of a defendant's earnings 
remaining after the deduction of all amounts required by 
law to be withheld. ,For purposes of a garnishment to 
enforce payment of a.judgment arising out of a failure to 
support dependent children, earnings also include, in 
addition to those items listed above, periodic payments 
pursuant to insurance policies of any type, including 
unemployment compensation, insurance benefit pay-
ments, and all gain derived from capital, from labor, or 
from both combined, including profit gained through sale 
or conversion of capital assets or as otherwise modified or 
adopted by law for the support of dependent children. 
(viii) The maximum portion of the aggregate dispos-
able earnings of defendant (if an individual) becoming due 
the defendant which is subject to garnishment is the 
lesser of: 
(A) Twenty-five per centum of defendant's dispos-
able earnings (fifty per centum for a garnishment to 
enforce payment of a judgment arising out of failure 
to support dependent children) computed for the pay 
period for which the earnings accrued; or 
(B) The amount by which the defendant's aggre-
gate disposable earnings computed for the pay period 
for which the earnings accrued exceeds the number of 
weeks in the period multiplied by thirty times the 
federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by the Fair 
Labor Standards Act in effect at the time the earnings 
are payable. 
(ix) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the gar-
nishee shall treat the defendant's earnings becoming due 
from the garnishee as the defendant's entire aggregate 
earnings for the purpose of computing the sum attached 
by the garnishment, 
(e) Service of writ; return; general service (Pre-judg-
ment or after judgment). The writ, any order pursuant to 
subdivision^) of this rule, and any order pursuant to Rule 
£AI/Q\ .Koii K* aprvori unon the garnishee by a sheriff, 
order and return thereof made in the same manner as a return 
of service upon a summons. All other service may be by first 
class mail or hand delivery. 
(f) Release or discharge of garnishment (Pre-judg-
ment or after judgment) . At any time either before or after 
the service of any writ of garnishment, the defendant may 
obtain a release or discharge thereof in the same manner and 
under the same conditions as a release or discharge of a writ 
of attachment may be obtained under the provisions of Sub-
division (f) of Rule 64C. The plaintiff may release a writ of 
garnishment by filing with the clerk a release of garnishment 
and serving a copy thereof upon the garnishee. 
(g) Answer of garnishee; delivery of proper ty (Pre-
judgment or after judgment) . The garnishee shall, within 
the time required by Subdivision (d)(ii) hereof, serve upon the 
court and the plaintiff verified answers to the interrogatories 
and provide proofs) of service upon defendant of the copy of 
the writ of garnishment, answers to interrogatories, the notice 
of garnishment and exemptions, and the applications by 
which a hearing may be requested, stating the manner and 
date of service. The garnishee may also deliver to the officer 
serving the writ the Property Subject to Garnishment as 
shown by the answer of the garnishee, and the officer shall 
make return of such property and money with the writ to the 
court, to be dealt with as thereafter ordered by the court. 
Thereupon, the garnishee shall be relieved from further lia-
bility in the proceedings, unless the answer shall be success-
fully controverted as hereinafter provided or the garnishee 
has willfully failed to serve copies of the writ of garnishment, 
answers to interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemp-
tions, and the applications by which a request for a hearing 
may be made on the defendant and other persons entitled 
thereto. 
(h) Procedure (Pre-judgment or after judgment) . The 
defendant or any other person who owns or claims an interest 
in the property subject to garnishment that is garnisheed may 
request a hearing to claim any exemption to the garnishment, 
or to challenge the issuance of the writ or the accuracy of the 
answers to interrogatories. Such request must be filed within 
ten days of the service (for purposes of this provision the date 
of service shall be the date of mailing if mailed or date of 
delivery if hand-delivered and no period for mailing pursuant 
to Rule 6(e) shall be used in computing the time period) of the 
copy of the materials required to be served by Subdivision 
(dXiii) upon the defendant and all others entitled to receive 
the same. A request for hearing filed prior to any request for 
the issuance of an Order to the garnishee to pay Property 
Subject to Garnishment shall be deemed as timely filed. The 
request for a hearing, which shall be provided by the gar-
nishee to the defendant and other persons shall be in a form to 
enable the defendant or other person to specify the grounds 
upon which the defendant challenges the issuance of the writ 
or the accuracy of the answers to interrogatories, or claims the 
amount garnisheed to be exempt, in whole or in part, includ-
ing, but not limited to exemptions claimed for Social Security 
benefits, Supplemental Security Income benefits, Veterans' 
benefits, unemployment benefits, Workers' Compensation ben-
efits, public assistance (welfare) benefits, alimony and child 
support, pensions, wage or other earnings for personal service, 
and non-ownership of the garnisheed property. Where per-
sonal services are compensated, but no amounts are required 
by law to be withheld, the amounts that would have been 
required to be withheld by law had the defendant been an 
employee of the garnishee are exempt. 
(i) If no request for hearing is filed. If a request for 
hearing is not filed as provided for in this Rule and the 
time for doing so has expired and the writ of garnishment 
was issued in aid of execution of a judgment or order for 
Rule 64D U l i n i rvujuiiro u r v ^ i v i u riwjy^jujLJKjxv^ 
plaintiffs request, shall release the Property Subject to 
Garnishment paid into court to plaintiff or plaintiff's 
attorney, or shall issue an order to the garnishee to pay 
the Property Subject to Garnishment that was withheld 
by the garnishee directly to plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney 
or as otherwise ordered by the court. If a request for 
hearing is not filed as provided for in this Rule and the 
time for doing so has expired and the writ issued was a 
prejudgment writ of garnishment, then the court or the 
clerk, upon plaintiffs request, shall issue an order to the 
garnishee to pay the Property Subject to Garnishment 
into court by delivery of such property to the sheriff or 
constable for that purpose. Property Subject to Garnish-
ment that is paid into court pursuant to a prejudgment 
writ of garnishment or at any time when a request for 
hearing has been filed shall be held by the clerk pending 
order of the court. 
(ii) Effect of failure to request hearing. If the 
defendant or any other person to whom the materials 
required to be served by Subdivision (d)(iii) fails to re-
quest a hearing as provided for herein, then defendant 
and such other persons shall be deemed to have accepted 
as correct the garnishee's answers to interrogatories and 
the amounts stated therein to be not exempt from gar-
nishment except as reflected in the answers to interroga-
tories. 
(iii) If a request for hear ing is filed. If a request for 
hearing is filed by or on behalf of the defendant or by any 
other person, the court shall set the matter for hearing 
within ten (10) days from the filing of the request and 
serve notice of that hearing upon all parties and claim-
ants by first class mail. If the court determines at the 
hearing that the writ was issued improperly, that the 
answers to interrogatories are inaccurate, or that any 
assets garnisheed are exempt from or are not subject to 
garnishment, the court shall immediately issue an order 
to the garnishee releasing such assets or portion thereof 
from the writ of garnishment. If the court finds that the 
assets or a portion thereof are subject to garnishment and 
not exempt, it shall issue an order to pay the Property 
Subject to Garnishment directly to plaintiff or plaintiff's 
attorney or as otherwise ordered by the court, except in 
the case of a prejudgment writ of garnishment where the 
order shall require that such property be paid into court 
by delivery of such property to the sheriff or constable for 
that purpose. Property Subject to Garnishment that is 
paid into court shall be held by the clerk pending order of 
the court 
(iv) If the property is o ther than money or its 
equivalent. Where the property is other than money or 
its equivalent, the court shall order that the garnishee 
deliver such property to the sheriff, constable, deputy, or 
such other person designated by court order. In the case of 
a writ issued after judgment, the person to whom the 
property was delivered shall sell as much of such property 
as may be necessary to satisfy the judgment together with 
costs of the garnishment proceedings and deposit the 
proceeds into court to be distributed by order of the court. 
Any surplus of such personal property or the proceeds 
thereof necessary to satisfy the writ of garnishment shall 
be returned to the defendant unless otherwise ordered by 
a court of competent jurisdiction. In the case of a prejudg-
ment writ, the person to whom the property is delivered 
shall maintain possession of the property until further 
order of the court, 
(i) Reply to answer of garnishee; trial of issues; judg-
ment (Pre-judgment or after Judgment). The plaintiff or 
defendant may, within 10 days after the service of any 
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and the other party to the principal action a reply to the whole 
or any part thereof and may also allege any matters which 
would charge the garnishee with liability except that all 
claims for exemptions to garnishment or non-ownership of 
property garnisheed shall be resolved under the procedures as 
otherwise provided for in Subdivision (h) herein. Such new 
matter in reply shall be taken as denied and the matter thus 
at issue shall be tried in the same manner as other issues of 
like nature. Judgment shall be entered upon the verdict or 
finding the same as if the garnishee had answered according 
to such verdict or finding. Costs shall be awarded in accor-
dance with the provisions of Rule 64(d). 
(j) Proceedings on failure of garnishee to comply 
with rule (Pre-judgment or after judgment) . If a gar-
nishee fails to answer interrogatories after payment of the 
required fee, or if any garnishee shall fail to send to the 
defendant the copy of the writ, answers to interrogatories, 
notice and applications required by Sections (d)(iii) of this 
Rule, the court may order the garnishee to appear before the 
court and show cause why the garnishee should not be held in 
contempt therefor and why the court should not order the 
garnishee to pay expenses and costs incurred by other parties 
to the proceeding as a result of garnishee's failure. After the 
garnishee has been personally served with an order to appear 
before the court and show cause, the court may make such 
orders as are just. Unless the court finds there was substantial 
justification for the garnishee's failure or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses or costs unjust, the court 
shall order the garnishee to pay reasonable expenses, includ-
ing attorney's fees, incurred as a result of garnishee's failure. 
(k) Release of garnishee for amount paid (Pre-judg-
ment or after judgment). Except as provided for herein, a 
garnishee who acts in accordance with this Rule shall be 
released from all demands by the defendant for all Property 
Subject to Garnishment .that is paid, delivered or accounted 
for by the garnishee pursuant to this Rule. 
(1) Interpleader of th i rd persons (Pre-judgment or 
after judgment). When any person other than the defendant 
claims or may claim that the property held in the possession, 
custody, or control of the garnishee pursuant to a Writ is not 
subject to garnishment, the court may on motion order that 
such claimant be interpleaded as a defendant to the garnish-
ment action, and if not already subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court, provide for notice thereof, in such form as the court 
shall direct, together with service of a copy of the order upon 
such third-party claimant in the manner required for the 
service of a summons. Thereupon the garnishee may pay or 
deliver to the court such property held pursuant to the Writ, 
which shall be a complete discharge from all liability to any 
party for the amount so paid or property so delivered. The 
third-party claimant shall thereupon be deemed a defendant 
to the garnishment action and shall answer within 10 days, 
setting forth any claim or defense. In case of default, judgment 
may be rendered as in any other cases of default which shall 
extinguish any claim of such third-party claimant. 
(m) Claims of garnishee against plaintiff or defen-
dant (Pre-judgment or after judgment). Every garnishee 
shall be allowed to retain or deduct out of the Property Subject 
to Garnishment all demands against the plaintiff and against 
the defendant of which the garnishee could have availed itself 
if the garnishee had not been served as garnishee, whether the 
same are at the time due or not so long as the claims are 
liquidated, but only to the extent that the amounts retained 
and deducted are applied to reduce a debt or other obligation 
of the plaintiff or defendant, except that should such property, 
otherwise subject to garnishment, be held as security for the 
payment of a debt or other obligation of the defendant to the 
garnishee, then such property need not be applied at that time 
but must remain subject to being applied at any time pending 
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the payment in full of the debt or other obligation. In answer-
ing the interrogatories propounded to the garnishee, the 
garnishee shall specify the amount retained or deducted and 
the person against whom the claim is made. Amounts retained 
and deducted for amounts owed by the plaintiff to the gar-
nishee shall also be applied in reduction of any judgment 
amount rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. 
All amounts properly garnisheed in excess of those amounts 
retained or deducted pursuant to this subdivision are subject 
to payment and distribution in accordance with this Rule. 
(n) Liability of garnishee on negotiable instruments 
(Pre-judgment or after judgment). No person shall be 
liable as garnishee by reason of having drawn, accepted, made 
or endorsed any negotiable instrument which is not in the 
possession, custody, or control of the garnishee at the time of 
service of the writ of garnishmeiit. 
(o) When garnishee is mortgagee or pledgee (Pre-
judgment or after judgment). When any Property Subject 
to Garnishment is mortgaged or pledged, or in any way held 
for the payment of a debt to the garnishee, the plaintiff may 
obtain an order from the court authorizing the plaintiff to pay 
the total amount of the obligation to the garnishee in accor-
dance with the terms of the mortgage, pledge or obligation, 
and requiring the garnishee to deliver such Property Subject 
to Garnishment according to the order of the court upon 
payment to such garnishee of the total obligation. 
(p) Where property is held to secure performance of 
other obligation (Pre-judgment or after judgment). If 
the Property Subject to Garnishment secures any obligation 
other than the payment of money and if the obligation secured 
does not require the personal performance of the defendant 
and can be performed by the plaintiff or its designee, the court 
may, upon plaintiffs motion, authorize the plaintiff or its 
designee to perform the obligation or tender performance and 
that upon such performance, or any tender thereof which is 
refused, the garnishee shall deliver the Property Subject to 
Garnishment in accordance with the order of the Court. 
(q) Disposition of property (Pre-judgment or after 
judgment). The Property Subject to Garnishment under 
either Subdivision (o) or (p) of this Rule or the proceeds from 
the sale thereof shall be applied to the extent available, first to 
satisfy any costs of sale, then to repay any amount paid by the 
plaintiff to the garnishee to satisfy the obligation of the 
defendant to the garnishee, then to pay the costs to perform 
the obligation of the defendant to the garnishee for an obliga-
tion other than the payment of money, and then to satisfy the 
writ of garnishment. 
(r) Order against garnishee for debt not due (Pre-
judgment or after judgment). When an order is made 
requiring a garnishee to pay an amount to the plaintiff or 
plaintiff's attorney or into court or otherwise provide property 
for disposition by the court and the same is not yet due to the 
defendant, payment or providing of property shall not be 
required until such payment or property is otherwise due the 
defendant from the garnishee. 
(s) Failure to proceed against garnisheed property 
(Pre-judgment or after judgment). Notwithstanding any 
other provision of this Rule, if a plaintiff fails, within sixty 
days from the filing of the garnishee's answers to interroga-
tories, to secure and personally serve on the garnishee an 
order requiring the garnishee to pay the property garnisheed 
into court or as otherwise provided herein, then the writ, 
which commanded the garnishee to hold the amount or 
property, shall be released and the garnishee discharged 
without further order of the court. If the Property Subject to 
Garnishment or any part thereof has been deposited with the 
court and the writ of garnishment was issued in aid of the 
AYoriitinn of a iudcrment or order for the payment of money, 
garnishee's answers to interrogatories, to request a release of 
the property garnisheed from the court in accordance with 
Subdivision (h)(i), then the writ shall be released; the garnish-
eed property shall be returned to the garnishee; and the 
garnishee discharged without further order of the court. 
Property Subject to Garnishment deposited with the court 
pursuant to a prejudgment writ of garnishment shall be 
released only upon order of the court. A release under this 
subdivision may be stayed upon order of the court for good 
cause shown. Such order shall not be binding upon the 
garnishee until served upon it. 
(t) Costs (Pre-judgment or after judgment). 
(i) Costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the 
plaintiff and against the defendant in the pursuit of any 
garnishee action instituted after judgment unless the 
court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an 
appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the 
garnishee action shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the State of Utah, its officers and 
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by 
law. 
(ii) The plaintiff must serve upon the defendant a copy 
of a memorandum of the items of necessary costs and 
disbursements in the garnishee action or actions, and file 
with the court a like memorandum duly verified stating 
that the items are correct, the disbursements have been 
necessarily incurred in the garnishee action, and the 
items of costs have not been claimed in any previous 
memorandum. The memorandum or memoranda may be 
filed at any time after judgment is rendered but in no 
event later than five days after the receipt of funds that 
would pay the judgment in full but for the payment of any 
costs associated with a garnishee action for which a 
memorandum or memoranda have not been filed with the 
court. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed, may, 
within seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs of the garnishee action, file a motion to have the 
costs taxed by the court. 
(iii) All costs incurred in garnishee actions prior to the 
rendering of a judgment shall be taxed according to Rule 
54(d) of these rules, 
(u) (i) A garnishment issued to enforce a judgment ob-
tained by the Office of Recovery Services, within the 
Department of Social Services, for repayment of overpay-
ments, as defined in Section 62A-11-202, shall continue to 
operate and require the garnishee to withhold the nonex-
empt portion of disposable earnings, as defined in Subsec-
tion 62A-11-103(2), at each succeeding earnings disburse-
ment interval until the garnishment is released in writing 
by the court or the Office of Recovery Services. 
(ii) The garnishment described in Subdivision (uXi) 
may not exceed 25% of earnings, as defined in Subsection 
62A-11-103(3), or the amount permitted under Section 
303(a) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 
Section 1673(a), whichever is less. 
(Amended effective April 24,1989; April 1,1990.) 
Rule 64E. Application of rule to other parties. 
The foregoing provisions of Rules 64A, 64B, 64C, and 64D 
authorizing provisional remedies to the plaintiff in an action 
shall likewise be available to a defendant or other party who 
has filed a counterclaim, cross-complaint, or other claim 
seeking an affirmative judgment, the party seeking such 
affirmative judgment being deemed the plaintiff, the party 
against whom the judgment is sought being deemed the 
defendant, and the counterclaim, cross-complaint or other 
claim being deemed the complaint. 
Rule 64F. Waiver of bond or undertaking. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Rules 64B, 64C and 64D 
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be just, subject to the further direction of the court; provided 
that if money is paid into court under this rule it shall be 
deposited and withdrawn in accordance with Section 78-27-4, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, or any like statute. 
Rule 68. Offer of judgment 
(a) Tender of money before suit. When in an action for 
the recovery of money only, the defendant alleges in his 
answer that before the commencement of the action he ten-
dered to the plaintiff the full amount to which the plaintiff was 
entitled, and thereupon deposits in court for the plaintiff the 
amount so tendered, and the allegation is found to be true, the 
plaintiff cannot recover costs, but must pay costs to the 
defendant. 
(b) Offer before trial. At any time more than 10 days 
before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may 
serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be 
taken against him for the money or property or to the effect 
specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days 
after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written 
notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the 
offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service 
thereof and thereupon judgment shall be entered. An offer not 
accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is 
not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the 
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable 
than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the 
making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not 
accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. 
Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental 
thereto. 
(a) Availability of writ of execution. A writ of execution 
is available to a judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment or 
other order requiring the delivery of property or the payment 
of money by a judgment debtor. 
(b) Property subject to execution. A writ of execution 
may be used to levy upon all of the judgment debtor's personal 
property and real property which is not exempt from execution 
under state or federal law. 
(c) Issuance of writ of execution. Unless otherwise or-
dered by the court, a writ of execution may be issued at any 
time within eight years following the entry of a judgment or 
order (except an execution may be stayed pursuant to Rule 
62), either in the county in which such judgment was ren-
dered, or in any county in which a transcript thereof has been 
filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court. 
Notwithstanding the death of a party after judgment, execu-
tion thereon may be issued, or such judgment may be en-
forced, as follows: 
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon 
the application of an authorized executor or administra-
tor, or successor in interest. 
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the 
judgment is for the recovery of real or personal property 
or the enforcement of a lien thereon. 
(d) Contents of writ and to whom it may be 
directed. The writ of execution shall be issued in the name of 
the State of Utah, and subscribed by the clerk of the court. It 
shall be issued to the sheriff or constable of any county in the 
state (and may be issued at the same time to different 
counties) but where it requires the delivery of possession or 
sale of real property, it shall be issued to the sheriff of the 
county where the real property or some part thereof is 
situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of per-
sonal property, it may be issued to a constable. It must 
intelligibly refer to the judgment, stating the court, the docket 
number, the county where the same is entered or docketed, the 
names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for the 
actually due thereon. The writ may be accompanied by a 
praecipe executed by the judgment creditor or the judgment 
creditor's counsel generally or specifically describing the real 
or personal property to be levied upon. It shall be directed to 
the sheriff of the county in which it is to be executed in cases 
involving real property, and shall require the officer to proceed 
in accordance with the terms of the writ; provided that if such 
writ is against the property of the judgment debtor generally 
it may direct the sheriff or constable to satisfy the judgment, 
with interest, out of the non-exempt personal property of the 
debtor, and if sufficient non-exempt personal property cannot 
be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with 
interest, out of the judgment debtor's non-exempt real prop-
erty. 
(e) When writ to be returned. The writ of execution 
shall be served at any time within sixty days after its receipt 
by the officer. It shall then be returned to the court from which 
it issued, and when it is returned the clerk must attach it to 
the record. 
(f) Service of the writ. Unless the execution otherwise 
directs, the officer must execute the writ against the non-
exempt property of the judgment debtor by levying on a 
sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient property; 
collecting or selling the choses in action and selling the other 
property in the manner set forth herein. Levy includes the 
seizure of the property and holding the property in person or 
through one or more agents, including the judgment debtor, 
appointed by the officer. When there is more property of the 
judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and 
accruing costs within view of the officer, the officer must levy 
only on such part of the property as the judgment debtor may 
indicate, if the property indicated is amply sufficient to satisfy 
the judgment and costs. 
When an officer has served an execution issued out of any 
court the officer may complete the return thereof after such 
date of service. 
(g) Notice to judgment debtor of sale and of exempt 
property and right to a hearing. At the time the writ of 
execution is issued, the clerk shall attach to the writ a notice 
of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing and two 
copies of an application by which the judgment debtor may 
request a hearing. 
Upon service of the writ, the sheriff or constable shall serve 
upon the judgment debtor, in the same manner as service of a 
summons in a civil action, or cause to be transmitted by both 
regular and certified mail, returned receipt requested, to the 
judgment debtor's last known address as provided by the 
judgment creditor, (i) the notice of execution and exemptions 
and right to a hearing, and (ii) the application by which the 
judgment debtor may request a hearing. Upon service of the 
writ, the sheriff or constable may also set the date of sale or 
delivery and serve upon the judgment debtor notice of the date 
and time of sale or delivery in the same manner as service of 
the notice of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing. 
The notice of execution and exemptions that is to be served 
upon the judgment debtor shall indicate in substance that 
certain property is or may be exempt from execution including 
but not limited to a homestead; tools of the trade; a motor 
vehicle used for the judgment debtor's business or profession; 
social security benefits; supplemental security income ben-
efits; veterans'benefits; unemployment benefits; workers'com-
pensation benefits; public assistance (welfare); alimony; child 
support; certain pensions; part or all of wages or other 
earnings from personal services; certain furnishings and ap-
pliances; musical instruments; and heirlooms (each not to 
exceed the amount allowed by law). The notice shall also 
indicate that the list is a partial list and other various 
property exemptions may be available under federal law or 
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must request a hearing within ten (10) days from the date of 
service of the notice upon the judgment debtor. For purposes of 
this provision, the date of service shall be the date of mailing, 
if mailed, or date of delivery, if hand-delivered, and no period 
for mailing under Rule 6(e) shall be used in computing the 
time period. 
If the writ, the notice of execution and exemptions and right 
to a hearing cannot be served upon the judgment debtor in the 
same manner as service of a summons in a civil action, and the 
judgment creditor does not have available the judgment 
debtor's last known address, only the following notice need be 
published under the caption of the case in a newspaper of 
general circulation in each county in which the property levied 
upon, or some part thereof, is situated: 
TO , Judgment Debtor: 
A writ of execution has been issued in the above-
captioned case, directed to the sheriff or constable of 
County, commanding the sheriff or con-
stable as follows: 
'WHEREAS, [Quoting body of writ of 
execution]." 
YOU MAY HAVE A RIGHT TO EXEMPT PROPERTY 
from the sale under statutes of the United States or this 
state, including Utah Code Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 
23, in the manner described in those statutes. 
The date of publication shall be deemed the date of service and 
the date of publication shall be not less than ten (10) days 
prior to the date of sale or delivery. 
This paragraph (g) shall not be applicable to judicial mort-
gage foreclosure proceedings commenced under Utah Code 
Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 37. 
(h) Request for hearing. 
(1) Time for request. The judgment debtor or any 
other person who owns or claims an interest in the 
property subject to execution may request a hearing to 
claim any exemption to the execution, or to challenge the 
issuance of the writ. Such request must be filed or served 
upon the judgment creditor or the attorney for the judg-
ment creditor within ten (10) days of the service upon the 
judgment debtor of the materials required to be served by 
paragraph (g) upon the judgment debtor. The request for 
a hearing, which shall be provided to the judgment debtor 
shall be in a form to enable the judgment debtor to specify 
the grounds upon which the judgment debtor challenges 
the issuance of the writ or claims the property executed 
upon to be exempt, in whole or in part. 
(2) If a request for hearing is filed. If a request for 
hearing is filed by or on behalf of the judgment debtor, the 
court shall set the matter for hearing within ten (10) days 
from the filing of the request and serve notice of that 
hearing upon all parties by first class mail. If the court 
determines at the hearing that the writ was issued 
improperly, or that any property seized is exempt from or 
is not subject to execution, the court shall ifnmediately 
issue an order to the officer releasing such property or 
portion thereof from the writ of execution. If the court 
finds that the property or a portion thereof is subject to 
execution and not exempt, it shall issue an order directing 
the officer to proceed with the sale of the non-exempt 
property subject to execution. If the originally scheduled 
date of sale for which notice has been given has passed, 
notice of the new date and time of sale shall be provided as 
required herein. No sale may be held until the Court has 
decided upon the issues presented at the hearing. At the 
hearing, the court may award costs as it deems appropri-
ate. 
(3) If no request for hearing is filed. If a request for 
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time for doing so has expired, then the officer shall 
proceed to sell or deliver the property subject to execution 
in accordance with the writ and this Rule 69. 
(4) This paragraph (h) shall not be applicable to judi-
cial mortgage foreclosure proceedings commenced under 
Utah Code Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 37. 
(i) Proceedings on sale of property. 
(1) Notice of sale. Before the sale of the property on 
execution notice thereof must be given as follows: (A) in 
case of perishable property or animals, by posting written 
notice of the time and place of sale, and generally describ-
ing the property to be sold, in the district courthouse and 
in at least three other public places of the county or city 
where the sale is to take place, for such a time as may be 
reasonable, considering the character and condition of the 
property; (B) in case of other personal property, by posting 
written notice of the time and place of sale, and generally 
describing the property to be sold, in the district court-
house and in at least three public places of the county or 
city where the sale is to take place, for not less than seven 
nor more than 14 days, and by publishing a copy thereof 
at least one time not less than one day preceding the sale 
in some newspaper of general circulation published or 
circulated in the county where the sale is to take place, if 
there is one; (C) in case of real property, by posting written 
notice of the time and place of sale, and particularly 
describing the property, for 21 days, on the property to be 
sold, at the place of sale, at the district courthouse of the 
county where the real property to be sold is situated, and 
in at least three public places of th6 county or city where 
the sale is to take place, and by publishing a copy thereof 
at least 3 times, once a week for 3 successive weeks 
immediately preceding the sale, in some newspaper of 
general circulation published or circulated in the county, 
if there is one. In addition, except for the sale of perish-
able property or animals, if notice of the date and time of 
sale has not been served upon the judgment debtor 
previously, notice of the date and time of sale shall be 
served upon the judgment debtor personally or by causing 
the same to be transmitted by regular or certified mail to 
the judgment debtor's last known address. 
(2) Postponement. If at the time and place appointed 
for the sale of any real or personal property on execution 
the officer shall deem it expedient and for the interest of 
all persons concerned to postpone the sale for want of 
purchasers, or other sufficient cause, the officer may 
postpone the same from time to time, until the same shall 
be completed; and in every such case the officer shall 
make public declaration thereof at the time and place 
previously appointed for the sale, and if such postpone-
ment is for a longer time than 72 hours, notice thereof 
shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of 
such sale is required to be given. 
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under ex-
ecution must be made at auction to the highest bidder, 
Monday through Saturday, legal holidays excluded, be-
tween the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and 8 o'clock p.m. After 
sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution 
no more shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the 
execution nor such officer's deputy shall become a pur-
chaser, or be interested in any purchase at such sale. 
When the sale is of personal property capable of manual 
delivery it must be within view of those who attend the 
sale. The sale must be held in a place reasonably acces-
sible to the general public. The property must be sold in 
such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; and 
when the sale is of real property, consisting of several 
known lots or parcels, they must be sold separately; or 
when a portion of such real property is claimed by a third 
person, and the third person requires it to be sold sepa-
rately, such portion must be thus sold. All sales of real 
property must be made at the courthouse of the county in 
which the property, or some part thereof, is situated. The 
judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the 
order in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold, 
when such property consists of several known lots or 
parcels, or of articles which can be sold to advantage 
separately, and the officer must follow such directions. 
The officer shall pay to the judgment creditor or the 
attorney for the judgment creditor so much of the sales 
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. Any excess in the 
proceeds over the judgment and reasonable accrued costs 
must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless other-
wise directed by the judgment or the court. 
(4) Accounting of sale. Upon request of the judg-
ment debtor or the judgment debtor's attorney, the-plain-
tiff shall deliver an accounting of any execution sale, 
including the amount due on the judgment, accrued costs, 
and the amount realized at the sale. 
(5) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be 
deemed an irrevocable offer; and if the purchaser refuses 
to pay the amount bid for the property struck off to such 
purchaser at a sale under execution, the officer may again 
sell the property at any time to the highest bidder, and if 
any loss is occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in 
addition to being liable on such bid, is guilty of a contempt 
of court and may be punished accordingly. When a pur-
chaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in such officer's 
discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of such person. 
(6) Personal property. When the purchaser of any 
personal property pays the purchase money, the officer 
making the sale shall deliver the property to the pur-
chaser (if such property is capable of manual delivery) 
and shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a certifi-
cate of sale and payment. Such certificate shall state that 
all right, title and interest which the debtor had in and to 
such property on the day the execution or attachment was 
levied, and any right, title and interest since acquired, is 
transferred to the purchaser. 
(7) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the 
officer shall give to /the purchaser a certificate of sale, 
containing: (A) a particular description of the real prop-
erty sold; (B) the price paid by the purchaser for each lot 
or parcel if sold separately; (C) the whole price paid; (D) a 
statement to the effect that all right, title, interest and 
claim of the judgment debtor in and to the property is 
conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where such sale 
is subject to redemption that fact shall be stated also. A 
duplicate of such certificate shall be filed for record by the 
officer in the office of the recorder of the county. The real 
property sold shall be subject to redemption, except where 
the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-years' 
unexpired term, in which event said sale is absolute. 
(j) Redemption of real property from sale. 
(1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to 
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be redeemed 
by the following persons or their successors in interest: 
(A) the judgment debtor; (B) a creditor having a lien by 
judgment, mortgage, or other lien on the property sold, or 
on some share or part thereof, subsequent to that on 
which the property was sold. 
(2) Redemption; how made. The person seeking re-
demption may make payment of the amount required to 
the person from whom the property is being redeemed, or 
for such person to the officer who made the sale, or such 
officer's successor in office. At the same time the redemp-
tioner must produce to the officer or person from whom 
the redemptioner seeks to redeem, and serve with the 
notice to the officer; (A) a certified copy of the judgment 
under which the redemptioner claims the right to redeem, 
or, if the redemptioner redeems upon a mortgage or other 
lien, a copy certified by the recorder; (B) an assignment, 
properly acknowledged or proved where the same is 
necessary to establish the claim; (C) an affidavit by the 
redemptioner or an authorized agent showing the amount 
then actually due on the judgment, mortgage or other 
lien. 
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The 
property may be redeemed within six months after the 
sale by paying the amount of the purchase with a sur-
charge of 6 percent thereon in addition, together with the 
amount of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable 
sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, up-
keep, or repair of any improvements upon the 
property,which the purchaser may have paid thereon 
after the purchase, with interest at the lawful rate on 
such other amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a 
creditor having a lien prior to that of the person seeking 
redemption, other than the judgment under which said 
purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with 
interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any 
sum demanded for redemption is reasonable or proper, 
the person seeking redemption may pay the amount 
necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to 
the court out of which execution or order authorizing the 
sale was issued, and at the same time file with the court 
and serve upon the purchaser a petition setting forth the 
item or items demanded to which the redemptioner ob-
jects, together with the grounds of objection; and there-
upon the court shall enter an order fixing a time for 
hearing of such objections. A copy of the order fixing time 
for hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than 
five days before the day of hearing. Upon the hearing of 
the petition the court shall enter an order determining the 
amount required for redemption. In the event an addi-
tional amount to that theretofore paid to the clerk is 
required, the person seeking redemption shall pay to the 
clerk such additional amount within 7 days. The pur-
chaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper cer-
tificate of redemption upon being paid the amount re-
quired by the court for redemption. 
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property is re-
deemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of 
redemption may, within 60 days after the last redemption 
and within six months after the sale, redeem the property 
from such last redemptioner in the same manner as 
provided in the preceding paragraph, upon paying the 
sum of such last redemption, with a surcharge of three 
percent thereon in addition, and the amount of any 
assessment or tax, and any reasonable sum for fire 
insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair 
of any improvements upon the property which the last 
redemptioner may have paid thereon, with interest on 
such amount, and, in addition, the amount of any lien 
held by such last redemptioner prior to the redemption-
er's own, with interest. 
(5) Notice of redemption. Written notice of any re-
demption shall be given to the officer and a duplicate filed 
with the recorder of the county. Similar notice shall be 
given of any taxes or assessments or any sums for fire 
insurance, and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair 
of any improvements upon the property, paid by the 
person redeeming, or the amount of any lien acquired, 
other than upon which the redemption was made. Failure 
to file such notice shall relieve any subsequent redemp-
tioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assessments, or 
other liens. 
(6) Certificate of redemption or conveyance. If no 
redemption is made within six months after the sale, the 
purchaser or the purchaser's assignee is entitled to a 
conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever 60 days have 
elapsed and no other redemption by a creditor has been 
made and notice thereof has been given, the last redemp-
tioner, or assignee, is entitled to a sheriff's deed at the 
expiration of six months after the sale. If the judgment 
debtor redeems, the judgment debtor must make the 
same payments as are required to effect a redemption by 
a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of the sale is 
terminated and the debtor is restored to the debtor's 
estate. Upon a redemption by the debtor, the person to 
whom the payment is made must execute and deliver to 
the debtor a certificate of redemption, duly acknowledged. 
Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the office of 
the county recorder where the property is situated. 
(7) Rents during period of redemption. The pur-
chaser from the time of sale until a redemption, and a 
redemptioner from the time of redemption until another 
redemption, is entitled to receive from any tenant in 
possession the rents of the property sold or the value of 
the use and occupation thereof. But when any rents or 
profits have been received by the judgment creditor or 
purchaser, or their assigns, from the property thus sold 
preceding such redemption, the amounts of such rents 
and profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to 
be paid; and if the redemptioner or judgment debtor, 
before the expiration of the time allowed for such redemp-
tion, demands in writing of such purchaser or creditor, or 
their assigns, a written and verified statement of the 
amounts of such rents and profits thus received, the 
period for redemption is extended five days after such 
sworn statement is given by such purchaser or such 
purchaser's assigns to such redemptioner or debtor.; If 
such purchaser or such purchaser's assigns shall for a 
period of one month from and after such demand, fail or 
refuse to give such statement, such redemptioner or 
debtor may, within 60 days after such demand, bring an 
action to compel' an accounting and disclosure of such 
rent$ and profits, and until 15 days from and after the 
final determination of such action the right of redemption 
is extended to such redemptioner or debtor, 
(k) Remedies of purchaser. 
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time al-
lowed for redemption, the court may restrain the commis-
sion of waste on the property, upon motion, with or 
without notice, of the purchaser, or such purchaser's 
successor in interest. But it is not waste for the person in 
possession of the property at the time ofsah, or entitled to 
possession afterwards, during the period allowed for re-
demption, to continue to use it in the same manner in 
which it was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary 
course of husbandry, or to make the necessary repairs or 
buildings thereon or to use wood or timber on the property 
therefor, or for the repair offences, or for fuel for a family 
while such person occupies the property. After the estate 
has become absolute, the purchaser or a successor in 
interest may maintain an action to recover damages for 
ir\jury to the property by the tenant or other person in 
possession after sale and before possession is delivered 
under the conveyance. 
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of 
property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted 
therefrom. Where, because of irregularities in the pro-
ceedings concerning the sale, or because the property sold 
was not subject to execution and sale, or because of the 
reversal or discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of 
property sold on execution, or a successor in interest, fails 
to obtain the property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted 
therefrom, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall, on 
motion of such party and after such notice to the judg-
ment creditor as the court may prescribe, enter judgment 
against such judgment creditor for the price paid by the 
purchaser, together with interest. In the alternative, if 
such purchaser or a successor in interest, fails to recover 
possession of any property or is dispossessed thereof or 
evicted therefrom in consequence of irregularity in the 
proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property 
sold was not subject to execution and sale, the court 
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party 
and after such notice to the judgment debtor as'the court 
may prescribe, revive the original judgment in the name 
of the petitioner for the amount paid by sucb purchaser at 
the sale, with interest thereon from the time of payment 
at the same rate that the original judgment bore; and the 
judgment so revived shall have the same force and effect 
as would an original judgment of the date of the revival. 
(1) Contribution and reimbursement; how enforced. 
When upon an execution against several persons more than 
a pro rata part of the judgment is satisfied out of the proceeds 
of the sale of the property of one, or one of them pays, without 
a sale, more than such person's proportion, and the right of 
contribution exists, such person may compel such contribution 
from the others; and where a judgment against several is upon 
an obligation of one or more as security for the others, and the 
surety has paid the amount or any part thereof, by sale of 
property or otherwise, the surety may require reimbursement 
from the principal. The person entitled to contribution or 
reimbursement shall, within one month after payment, or sale 
of the property in the event there is a sale, file in the court 
where the judgment was rendered a notice of such payment 
and the claim for contribution or reimbursement. Upon the 
filing of such notice the clerk must make an entry thereof in 
the margin of the docket which shall have the effect of a 
judgment against the other judgment debtors to the extent of 
their liability for contribution or reimbursement. 
(m) Payment of judgment by person indebted to judg-
ment debtor. After the issuance of an execution and before 
its return, any person indebted to the judgment debtor may 
pay to the officer the amount of the debt, or so much thereof as 
may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the officer's 
receipt is a sufficient discharge for the amount paid. 
(n) Where property is claimed by th i rd person. If an 
officer shall proceed to levy any execution on any goods or 
chattels claimed by any person other than the defendant, or 
should the officer be requested by the judgment creditor so to 
do, such officer may require the judgment creditor to give an 
undertaking, with good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs 
and damages that the officer may sustain by reason of the 
detention or sale of such property; and until such undertaking 
is given, the officer may refuse to proceed against such 
property. 
(o) Order for appearance of judgment debtor; 
arrest . At any time when execution may issue on a judgment, 
the court from which an execution might issue shall, upon 
written motion of the judgment creditor, with or without 
notice as the court may determine, issue an order requiring 
the judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to 
appear before the court, a master, or other person appointed 
by the court, at a specified time and place to answer concern-
ing the judgment debtor's property. A judgment debtor, or if a 
corporation, any officer thereof, may be required to attend 
outside the county in which such person resides, but the court 
may make such order as to mileage and expenses as is just. 
The order may also restrain the judgment debtor from dispos-
ing of any nonexempt property pending the hearing. Upon the 
hearing such proceedings may be had for the application of the 
property of the judgment debtor toward the satisfaction of the 
judgment as on execution against such property. 
(p) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. At any 
time when execution may issue on a judgment, upon proof by 
affidavit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the court that any 
person or corporation has property of such judgment debtor or 
is indebted to the judgment debtor in an amount exceeding 
two hundred fifty dollars, not exempt from execution, the 
court may order such person or corporation or any officer or 
agent thereof, to appear before the court or a master at a 
specified time and place to answer concerning the same. 
Witness fees and mileage, if any, may be awarded by the court. 
(q) Order prohibiting transfer of property. If it ap-
pears that a person or corporation, alleged to have property of 
the judgment debtor or to be indebted to the judgment debtor 
in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt from execu-
tion, claims an interest in the property adverse to such 
judgment debtor or denies such indebtedness, the court may 
order such person or corporation to refrain from transferring 
or otherwise disposing of such interest or debt until such time 
as may reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to 
bring an action to determine such interest or claim and 
prosecute the same to judgment. Such order may be modified 
or vacated by the court at any time upon such terms as may be 
just. 
(r) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and 
testify in any proceedings brought under this rule in the same 
manner as upon the trial of an issue. 
(s) Order for property to be applied on judgment. The 
court or master may order any property of the judgment 
debtor, not exempt from execution, in the possession of the 
judgment debtor or any other person, or due to the judgment 
debtor, to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment. 
(t) Appointment of receiver. The court may appoint a 
receiver of the property of the judgment debtor, not exempt 
from execution, and may forbid any transfer or other disposi-
tion thereof or interference therewith until its further order 
therein; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with 
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of the 
appointment shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of 
the county in which any real estate sought to be affected 
thereby is situated. 
Rule 70. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title. 
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land 
or to deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any other 
specific act and the party fails to comply within the time 
specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of 
the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the 
court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the 
party. On application of the party entitled to performance and 
upon order of the court, the clerk shall issue a writ of 
attachment or sequestration against the property of the dis-
obedient party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court 
may also in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real 
or personal property is within the state, the court in lieu of 
directing a conveyance thereof may enter a judgment divest-
ing the title of any party and vesting it in others and such 
judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form 
of law. When any order or judgment is for the delivery of 
possession, the party in whose favor it is entered is entitled to 
a writ of execution or assistance upon application to the clerk. 
Rule 71 A. Process in behalf of and against persons not 
parties. 
When an order is made in favor of a person who is not a 
party to the action, he may enforce obedience to the order by 
ih* Bom* mwflUR An if he were a Dartv: and, when obedience to 
an order may be lawfully enforced against a person who is not 
a party, he is liable to the same process for enforcing obedience 
to the order as if he were a party. 
Rule 71B. Proceedings where parties not summoned. 
(a) Effect of failure to serve all defendants. Where the 
action is against two or more defendants and the summons is 
served on one or more, but not all of them, the plaintiff may 
proceed against the defendants served in the same manner as 
if they were the only defendants. 
(b) Proceedings after judgment against parties not 
originally served. When a judgment has been recovered 
against one or more, but not all, of several persons jointly 
indebted upon an obligation, the plaintiff may require any 
person not originally served with the summons to appear and 
show cause why he should not be bound by the judgment in the 
same manner as though he had been originally served with 
process. 
(c) Summons and affidavit; contents and service. The 
plaintiff shall issue a summons, describing the judgment, and 
requiring the defendant to appear within the time required for 
appearance in response to an original summons, and show 
cause why he should not be bound by such judgment. The 
summons, together with a copy of an affidavit on behalf of the 
plaintiff to the effect that the judgment, or some part thereof 
remains unsatisfied, and specifying the amount actually due 
thereon, shall be served upon the defendant and returned in 
the same manner as the original summons. 
(d) What constitutes the pleadings. The pleadings shall 
consist of plaintiffs affidavit, the summons, and the answer of 
the defendant, if any; provided that if defendant denies his 
liability on the obligation upon which the judgment was 
originally recovered, a copy of the original complaint and 
judgment shall be included. 
(e) Hearing; judgment. The matter may be tried as other 
cases; but if the issues are found against the defendant, the 
judgment shall not exceed the amount of the original judg-
ment remaining unsatisfied, with interest and costs. 
PART IX. 
APPEALS. 
Rules 72 to 76. Repealed. 
PARTX. 
DISTRICT COURTS AND CLERKS. 
Rule 77. District courts and clerks. 
(a) District courts always open. The district courts shall 
be deemed always open for the purpose of filing any pleading 
or other proper paper, of issuing and returning mesne and 
final process, and of making and directing all interlocutory 
motions, orders, and rules. 
(b) Trials and hearings; orders in chambers. All trials 
upon the merits shall be conducted in open court and so far as 
convenient in a regular courtroom. All other acts or proceed-
ings may be done or conducted by a judge in chambers without 
the attendance of the clerk or other court officials and at any 
place within the state, either within or without the district; 
but no hearing, other than one ex parte, shall be conducted 
outside the county wherein the matter is pending without the 
consent of all the parties to the action affected thereby. 
(c) Clerk's office and orders by clerk. The clerk's office 
with the clerk or a deputy in attendance shall be open during 
business hours on all days except Saturdays, Sundays, and 
legal holidays. All motions and applications in the clerk's office 
for issuing mesne process, for issuing final process to enforce 
and execute judgments, for entering defaults or judgments by 
